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PLEASURE PATENTS
ANDREW GILDEN*

SARAH R. WASSERMAN RAJEC*
Abstract: The United States Patent and Trademark Office has granted thousands
of patents for inventions whose purpose is to facilitate the sexual pleasure of their
users. These "pleasure patents" raise a range of novel questions about both patent
theory and the relationship between law and sexuality more broadly. Given that
"immoral" inventions were long excluded from the patent system, and that sexual
devices were widely criminalized for much of the past 150 years, how have patentees successfully framed the contributions of their sexual inventions? If a patentable invention must be both new and useful, how have patentees described
the utility of sexual pleasure? This Article identifies several hundred patents that
the USPTO has formally classified as improving sexual stimulation and intercourse, and it closely examines how patentees have described the utility of sexual
pleasure over time. In describing the utility of technologies such as phalluses, vibrators, and virtual reality systems, patentees employ a diverse and rich set of
themes about the purposes and social values of sexual pleasure. By facilitating
sexual pleasure, these patented technologies can, according to their inventors:
improve marital harmony, overcome female frigidity, calm fears of HIV transmission, reduce sexual assault, suppress demand for sex work, minimize the
loneliness of single people, facilitate LGBTQIA relationships, and promote the
emotional well-being of people with disabilities. As social and sexual norms have
changed over time, so too have the various explanations for the social value of
pleasure patents. This Article shows that the patent system is an underappreciated,
and perhaps unexpected, archive of historical and contemporary sexual norms.
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INTRODUCTION

When lawyers and scholars think about sex, patents likely do not spring
to mind. This Article challenges that intuition. Since the early-twentieth century, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO" or "Patent Office") has issued hundreds of patents that are classified as "massage for the
genitals" or "devices for improving sexual intercourse,"I notwithstanding a
background culture and legal system that has been largely hostile to sexual
innovation. Patents in this classification disclose a wide range of technologies
which include: phalluses of all different shapes, sizes, and materials; clitoral
stimulators; 2 pelvic harnesses to be worn during intercourse; 3 mouthguards to
be worn during oral sex; 4 and masturbatory jacuzzis. 5 These diverse patentswhich we call "pleasure patents"-in turn describe a wide range of socially
useful functions served by these technologies: promoting marital accord; overcoming sexual dysfunction; reducing loneliness in single people; preventing
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases; facilitating the sex lives of
LGBTQIA 6 and people with disabilities; and empowering women to take
charge of their own sexual happiness.
The existence of these patents is surprising-doctrinally, theoretically,
and historically. First, for over 180 years, patent doctrine professed to exclude
from protection inventions that were "injurious to the . .. sound morals of society." 7 Under this doctrine of moral utility, the Patent Office rejected applications for "immoral" inventions such as gambling machines and deceptive
goods. For example, the immorality bar invalidated patents on lottery devices,'
gambling machines,9 and a variety of "deceptive" inventions. 0 The requirement became less stringent over the years," and in 1999, in Juicy Whip, Inc. v
1See CooperativePatent Classification:A61H19/00, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/cpc/html/cpc-A61H.html#A61H19/00 [https://perma.cc/
ZBP9-PMBZ].
2 U.S. Patent No. 2,024,983 (filed Sept. 10, 1934) (issued Dec. 17, 1935).
3 U.S. Patent No. 2,594,097 (filed Nov. 15, 1949) (issued Apr. 22, 1952); U.S. Patent No.
6,604,526 B1 (filed Feb. 1, 2002) (issued Aug. 12, 2003).
4 U.S. Patent No. 5,970,981 (filed Aug. 27, 1998) (issued Oct. 26, 1999).
5 U.S. Patent No. 5,920,923 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (issued July 13, 1999).
6 We use LGBTQIA as a universal term to represent people that associate with myriad genderand sexual orientation-defined identities.
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
8 Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
9 Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512, 513 (7th Cir. 1922) (invalidating an invention that had "a
concealing means . . to enable the gambling instinct of purchasers to be appealed to in promoting the
sale of merchandise").
10 See infra Part III.
" For example, courts allowed patents on gambling devices based on theoretical acceptable uses.
See Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 802 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 1977) (noting that gambling
had become legal invarious states and adopting the idea that as long as an invention was "susceptible
of good uses," utility could be found).
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Orange Bang, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
deception can itself be useful and is not a reason to deny a patent.12 This history suggests that it would have been difficult to obtain patents on sex toys and
that the availability of such patents would likely have followed the general
trends in patent utility doctrine. The suppression of sex toys was, after all, the
subject of state and federal legislative efforts.1 3 Surprisingly, however, pleasure
patents were issued steadily throughout the time that courts were cracking
down on gambling and deception.
Second, from the perspective of patent theory, patents are thought to serve
both notice and disclosure functions, defining the scope of the claimed invention 4 and enabling others to make and use it.' 5 Nevertheless, patents can disclose more than the traditional story suggests. The patent application is a persuasive document, drafted to convince patent examiners, judges, and potential
infringers of the disclosed invention's merits.1 6 To be persuasive, patent applicants must pull from the social norms and values of their audiences. For example, patents on inventions tailored to women will likely tap into the societal
norms and expectations of women's interests and needs.' 7 Similarly, where a
claimed invention touches upon issues of sexuality, the applicant's efforts to
explain the utility, novelty, and non-obviousness oftheir invention can provide
useful insights into dominant perceptions of sex in that moment in time. Pleasure patents demonstrate that patent law can provide an important lens to examine the evolving relationship between innovation and social change.
Third, the USPTO's issuance of pleasure patents stands in stark contrast
with the historical legal treatment of sexual technologies more broadly. Since
the nineteenth century, the USPTO was granting pleasure patents at the same
12 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The fact that one product can be altered to
make it look
like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.").
" See infra Part III.
14 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,731 (2002)
("A patent
holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.").
15 Jeanne C. Fromer, PatentDisclosure, 94 IOWAL. REV. 539, 541 (2009) (stressing the "cumulative" nature of patent law and the importance of publicizing inventions "so that science can progress
by building on the divulged knowledge"); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 622-23 (2010) (stating the three functions of a patent: (1) reveal the invention publicly; (2) assert the "scope of the exclusory right" and offer notice to third parties of potential infringements; and (3) offer the basis for future patent litigation and judicial assessment of the
patent's credibility or any alleged violations).
16 Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patentsas Genre: A Prospectus,26 LAW & LITERATURE 163,
172-73 (2014) (explaining the process of patent creationversus patent prosecution to note that "patent
drafters are keenly aware that they are addressing multiple audiences" over the life of the patent, depending on its stage).

" See, e.g., KaraW. Swanson, Getting a Grip on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality, andPatentLaw,

23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 57, 61 (2011) ("As American women donned their corsets [at the turn
of the twentieth century], they had a daily intimate relationship with a heavily patent-protected technology.").
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time local, state, and federal law enforcement attempted to suppress the manufacture and sale of sexual devices.' 8 Federal law banned the mailing of immoral devices in 1873;19 obscenity laws justified the seizure of sex toys for much
of the twentieth century;2 0 and several states passed criminal laws that expressly prohibited the sale of sex toys in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s.21 Moreover,
throughout these various time periods, nearly all forms of nonprocreative sex
were criminalized.22 Against this hostile legal backdrop, the federal government granted valuable property rights to large numbers of sexual technologies
that were ultimately unlawful to use, sell, or manufacture.
This Article is the first legal scholarship to describe the phenomenon of
pleasure patents 23 by (1) reviewing over four hundred patents issued between
1935 and 2019, (2) showing how patentees have described the utility of sexual
technologies, and (3) demonstrating how these descriptions have changed over
time. It reveals that the changing narratives used to justify granting patents on
dildos, vibrators, and other sexual devices often closely parallel the evolving

" See infraPart II. See generallyHALLIE LIEBERMAN,

Buzz: A STIMULATING HISTORY OF THE
SEX TOY (2017) (detailing the history of the patenting and regulation of the sex toy).
19 See Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (comprising part of the Comstock laws, which
criminalized the use of the Post Office to send any obscene materials that were sexual in nature).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 211 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Md. 1962) (sustaining an obscenity conviction for the sale of rubber penile extenders found to be "patently offensive").
21 See Richard Glover, Comment, Can 'tBuy a Thrill: Substantive Due
Process, EqualProtection,
and CriminalizingSex Toys, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555, 561-62 (2010) (caveating that
states with suchbans against sex toys tended to repeal those statutes overtime due to "constitutional
technicalities").
22
See generallyJOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1997) (detailing the history of sexuality in the United States). In the
nineteenth century, sexual behavior without the intent of producing children was illegal. See Richard
Weinmeyer, The Decriminalizationof Sodomy in the United States, 16 AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS
916, 916 (2014) (discussing the various conduct that fell under nineteenth century "sodomy laws").
These laws encompassed both heterosexual and homosexual nonprocreative sex, despite theirprimary
function in the twenty-first century as weapons against the LGBTQIA community. See id (explaining
how laws against nonprocreative sex evolved overtime to focus more on same-sex relationships); see
also Why Sodomy Laws Matter, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/why-sodomy-laws-matter [https://
perma.cc/PFR2-ECNQ] (pinpointing the 1960s and '70s as the era when sodomy laws narrowed from
"a larger body of law . . designed to prevent nonprocreative sexuality anywhere" to a surgical strike
against homosexual sex).
23 The most extensive treatment of sexual technologies in the patent system is "American Sex
Machines," a book published in the mid-1990s and aimed at educating a general audience. HOAG
LEVINS, AMERICAN SEX MACHINES: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF SEX AT THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE

(1996). No law review article has previously discussed sex toy patents in more than passing mention.
See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in IntellectualProperty, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 119, 151 (2012) ("In the context of IP, even though patent, copyright, and trademark laws have
all moved away from the days of denying wholesale protection for objects like sex toys and works and
marks that address sexual matter, underlying anti-sex or sex-normative judgments continue to percolate up, particularly in copyright and trademark laws.").
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norms of American sexual culture writ large.24 For example, as marriage rates
declined and nonmarital sex became less stigmatized since the 1960s, utility
narratives in patent applications connecting sexual technologies and happy
marriages also declined. Similarly, as the HIV/AIDS crisis emerged in the
1980s, a significant percentage of pleasure patents emphasized that sexual
technologies could be enjoyable components of safer sex practices. And as
LGBTQIA communities became increasingly socially accepted in the 1990s,
queer sexuality emerged as a frequent theme in pleasure patents.
This Article has important ramifications for the study of both intellectual
property and sexuality law. Patents too rarely have been approached through a
cultural or sociological lens-in other words, conceived as living texts that
embody and feed into the norms of particular social and historical contexts.2 5
The pleasure patents that this Article examines provide a diverse and evolving
archive of sexual norms that raise numerous questions about the role of patent
law and patented technologies within broader ecosystems of gender and sexuality. Moreover, patents-and intellectual property generally-have rarely
been the focus of scholars writing about law and sexuality.26 Several gender
and sexuality scholars have indeed critiqued the overall sex negativity of U.S.
We use "narrative" to describe the themes that emerge from these patent applications, en
masse,
within and reflective of the legal atmosphere in a given time period. While each patent can be said to
contain its own narrative describing the state of the art prior to the invention and the problem the invention solves, this study looks for themes in aggregate, drawing narrative from repetition.
25 See Burk & Reyman, supra note 16, at 164 ("[W]e want to consider how the language of patent
documents shapes meaning, not simply in the process of technological innovation, but as an artifact of
a society thatvalues technological innovation."); Kara W. Swanson, Patents,PoliticsandAbortion20
(Ne. Univ. Sch. of L., Rsch. Paper 161-2013, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337062 [https://perma.
cc/9MP5-YEAS] ("[I]ntellectual property law has been resistant to law and society scholarship, and
the patent system, perhaps most of all. It is simply assumed to exist in a world apart...." (footnote
omitted)). For scholarship that has approached patent law in this manner, see generally MADHAVI
24

SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012);

Brian L. Frye, Invention of a Slave, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 (2018); Swanson, supra note 17.
26 The most prominent scholarship focused on the relationship between patent law and sexuality
is Kara Swanson's historical excavation of corset patents. See generally Swanson, supra note 17.
Copyright, trademark, and publicity rights have received greater attention for their intersection with
questions of sexuality. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and the Commoditization of Sex, in
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 339, 339

(Irene Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015) (discussing the intersection of "copyright law and
pornography"); Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, andIntellectualProperty, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67, 81
(2018) (unpacking questions of "public" versus "private" content in the context of sexually explicit
content-sharing); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademarklntersectionality,57 UCLAL. REV. 1601, 1621 (2010)
(using "Aunt Jemima" maple syrup as an example of the complex blend in trademark law between
cultural iconography, social appetite, and corporate value); Rothman, supra note 23, at 119 (focusing
on "sex exceptionalism" in legal contexts of copyright and trademark); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair
Ladies: Sex, Gender, andFairUse in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & LAW 273, 294
(2007) (noting the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals's critical interpretation of a sexually and racially
progressive reimagination of the novel Gone With the Wind as "attack[ing]" the original book (quoting
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2001))).

20221

PleasurePatents

577

law, and have pushed the legal system to more openly embrace the value of
sexual pleasure.27 And although pleasure patents are certainly subject to various forms of feminist critique-a critique we hope this Article spurs-patent
law nonetheless remains an area of law that openly and unapologetically confronts the potential social value of sexual pleasure. Sexuality and technology
have long been intertwined, and this Article is intended to bring legal scholars
in these fields closer together.
Part I sets forth the methodology for our study as well as the results of our
close examination of over four hundred pleasure patents. 28 It reveals several
themes patentees use to explain the value of their inventions, and it shows how
the use of these themes has changed in frequency over time. Parts II and III
place our study into a broader legal context. Part II situates pleasure patents
within the law of the sex toy, which-unlike patent law-is notable for its long
history of prohibition and punishment. 29 Part III situates pleasure patents within the relevant patent doctrines, in particular the rise and fall of the moral utility bar to patentability, 30 a bar remarkably less prohibitory than the laws discussed in Part II. Finally, Part IV provides a series of potential takeaways for
intellectual property scholars and for scholars of law and sexuality.31
I. PLEASURE AT THE PATENT OFFICE

Notwithstanding a background culture that often vacillates between discomfort and outright hostility to frank discussions of sexuality, the USPTO has
issued hundreds of patents for devices and processes designed to bring about
sexual pleasure in their users. Our study asks, accordingly, how hundreds of
patentees were able to obtain the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell innovations in sexual pleasure-seeking. It closely examines over four hundred
pleasure patents and asks how so many patentees have successfully established
the utility of sexual technologies and convinced the USPTO that they have
made a novel and non-obvious contribution to their fields. This Part first explains how pleasure patents are classified and then describes our study and
findings of the pleasure patent class of inventions.

27 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a "Culturally Cliterate"Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 328 (2008); Katherine M. Franke, Essay, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on
Feminism, Law, andDesire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181,205 (2001); Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 159 (2014). Professors Appleton, Franke, and Kaplan each adopt a fresh perspective within the realm of sex positive legal analysis, to examine and challenge the repercussions of
laws and social values that denigrate sexual pleasure. See infra notes 231-235.
" See infra notes 32-119 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 120-175 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 176-212 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 213-245 and accompanying text.
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A. ClassifyingPleasure
To begin answering these questions, we collected and analyzed 426 granted patents in a specific technology class. The relevant classification for our
purposes is "A61H19/00 - Massage for the genitals; Devices for improving
sexual intercourse" under the Cooperative Patent Classification System. 32The
dataset includes all patents issued between June 14, 1932--the earliest issue
date of any pleasure patent--and December 31, 2018. Although granted patents in this category span nearly ninety years, their quantity has increased substantially in recent decades. As shown in Figure A, below, 8 patents were
granted prior to 1970, 14 between 1970-1979, 11 between 1980-1989, 47 between 1990-1999, 117 between 2000-2009, and 229 between 2010-2018.33
Fgre

A:Ga

d A.1

'

aet

B. The Study
As the goal of this study was to assess how patentees were able to establish the utility, novelty, and non-obviousness of often-taboo inventions, we focused our attention on the specification portion of the patents. Typically, this
portion of the patent application provides a summary ofthe invention, contextualizes the invention in a relevant field, and poses extant problems within the
field that the invention is meant to address. In compiling this dataset, the goal
was not to review every patent that might conceivably relate to sexual pleas32 For an overview of the various patent classification
systems and the relationship between them,
see generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The FieldofInvention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REv. 899 (2017).
" See Dataset, Andrew Gilden, Assoc. Professor of L., Willamette Univ., Sarah R. Wasserman
Rajec, Professor of L., William & Mary L. Sch., Pleasure Patents & Related Historical Data (2021)
(on file with the authors) (amassing data on over four hundred sex device patents from 1935 to 2019
as well as demographical data on related topics, such as marriage rates).
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ure. Instead the goal was to get a sense of how patentees have described sexual
technologies and how those descriptions have changed over time. A dataset
comprised of solely A61H19/00-classified patents effectively achieves these
goals by only including technologies that are explicitly sexual in purpose and
by allowing observation of how patentees describe a relatively circumscribed
set of technologies overtime. Accordingly, this dataset excludes pharmaceutical and device patents for treating erectile dysfunction (to the extent not also
classified as A61H19/00), 34 as well as patents that are classified for a nonsexual purpose, but that might nonetheless be repurposed in sexual ways. 35
After initially reviewing a sample of approximately fifty patents classified
under A61H19/00, we observed several different narratives that applicants
used to prove the utility, novelty, and non-obviousness of their inventions-divided according to the Subsections, below. Numerous patentees emphasized
thattheir sexual devices-such as vibrators or dildos-could be used to facilitate happy marriages. 36 Others emphasized therapeutic effects, such as overcoming sexual dysfunction, loneliness, or depression. 37 Still others framed
their pleasure devices in terms of promoting sexual abstinence and reducing
the spread of Sexually Transmitted Infections ("STIs").38 More recent patents

4 See, e.g., CooperativePatentClassification:A61F5/41, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug.
2021), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/cpc/html/cpc-A61F.htm#A6F5/41
[https://
penna.cc/3 CZP-63VY] ("Devices for promoting penis erection."); CooperativePatentClassification:
A61P]5/00, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 2021), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/
classification/cpc/html/cpc-A61P.html#A61P15/00 [https://perma.cc/7WNW-738U] ("Drugs forgenital or sexual disorders . . ; Contraceptives."); CooperativePatentClassification:A47C15/008, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 2021), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/cpc/html/
cpc-A47C.html#A47C15/008 [https://perma.cc/4T8A-2XR7] ("[S]eatingfurniture . . for sexual intercourse."); Cooperative Patent Classification: Y]0S5/929, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug.
2021), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/cpc/html/cpc-Y0S.html#Y10S5/929
[https://
perma.cc/T3D9-UUGS] ("Beds . . [f]acilitating sexual relations."). For a discussion of some of the
notable patents excluded from our study, see LEVINS, supra note 23, at 117-30.
5 The most notable technologies excluded from this dataset are the earliest commercial vibrators,
which were officially marketed as a treatment for a range of medical needs, even if their sexual potential was an open secret. See infra Part III. Although some of the earliest vibrators did receive patent
protection, and were upheld in litigation, they are classified as "A61H21/00 Massage devices for cavities of the body, e.g. nose, ears and anus" and are silent as to their commonly sexual purpose. See, e.g.,
U. S. Patent No. 773,234 (filed Aug. 27, 1903) (issued Oct. 25, 1904); Lambert Snyder Vibrator Co. v.
Marvel Vibrator Co., 138 F. 82, 82-83 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905) (upholding the issuance of a vibrator
patent).
36 See infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (discussing sexual devices as a solution to supposed "female frigidity" and facilitating satisfying sex as a means to preserve lasting marriages).
37 See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text (explaining the health and wellness benefits
pleasure devices provide in non-partner sex or self-pleasure activities).
38 See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (introducing sex technology as avehicle for safe
sex practices).

5 80

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63 :57 1

focused on the potential to use new technologies to empower historically marginalized groups: women, LGBTQIA people, and people with disabilities. 39
Following this initial review, we then reviewed the specifications of all 426
patents in the dataset and coded them on the basis oftheir statements explaining
the importance of their inventions-and sexual pleasure more broadly. The authors coded for the following narratives, explained more fully in the Subsections
below: marriage; sexual frigidity; unmarried women; STIs; LGBTQIA sexuality; women's empowerment; people with disabilities; nonsexual medical needs;
reduction in crime/social ills; and histories of sexual technologies. The authors
also coded for the type of technology (dildo, vibrator, suction, artificial intelligence, virtual reality) and date of issuance. What emerged from the review of
these patents is a dynamic story about the evolution of sexual norms over the
past century. As cultural conversations around sex have shifted, so too have the
explicit justifications for granting patents for sexual technologies. The following subsections examine the diverse sexual narratives marshalled by patentees
and show how these narratives have ebbed and flowed over time.
1. Frigid Females and Dutiful Wives
In the earliest pleasure patents included in the dataset, patentees often
framed their sexual technologies as a means of overcoming a wife's "frigidity"
and facilitating sexual intercourse between heterosexual married couples. The
term "frigidity" historically has been associated with a broad range of women's
aversions to heterosexual, vaginal intercourse-including a perceived lack of
emotional warmth, experiences of physical pain, and difficulty or failure to
reach orgasm. 40 Throughout the twentieth century, women's frigidity was identified as a major contribution to unhappy marriages. 41 In response, feminist

39 See infra notes 84-119 and accompanying text (validating pleasure as a worthy justification for
sex-related inventions and elevating the importance of pleasure-seeking for all people, including those
of underrepresented groups).
40 See Suzanne Laba Cataldi, Sexuality Situated: Beauvoir on "Frigidity,"14 HYPATIA 70, 70
(1999) (using portraits of frigidity as illustrated in the fictional works of Simone de Beauvoir as an
avenue to explore frigidity as more than just a physical recoil, but an embodiment of the individual,
gender, and social dynamics at play during heterosexual sex).
41 See Katherine Angel, The History of FemaleSexual Dysfunction' as a Mental Disorderin the

20th Century, 23 CURRENT OP. PSYCHIATRY 536, 537 (2010) (describing the rampant misunderstanding during the early-twentieth century surrounding the female sexual experience and its subsequent
impact on marital relationships). Since the days of the Napoleonic Code, notions of "impotence, sterility, and frigidity" existed in the penumbra of scientific and medical study. See PETER CRYLE & ALISON MOORE, FRIGIDITY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 40 (2011) (exploring nineteenth-century theories of female and male sexuality). Social and political norms incorporated these conceptions of sexual
capacity; for example, the Napoleonic Code expressly permitted annulment for reasons of "impotence," while medical experts understood that "frigidity" in women was a completely different, more
amorphous sort of incapacity unrelated to physical abnormality. Id at 40-41.
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scholars critiqued efforts to identify, treat, and educate about frigidity for policing women's gender roles and sexual desires. 42
The pathologization of frigidity, and its connection with heteronormative
marriage, appear in numerous patent specifications. For example, U.S. Patent
No. 2,024,983 claims a ring-like device that helps stimulate a woman's clitoris
during intercourse. The disclosed purpose of the device was "for promoting
marital accord between married couples, the object . . being to provide means
for stimulating certain nerves of the female during intercourse, thus tending to
overcome frigidity in the wife." 43 The patentee further explained:
As is well known to the legal and medical professions a considerable number of divorces are caused by alleged frigidity of the wife
and many married couples are not in marital accord due to this fact
but by the use of this device for stimulating the nerves of and surrounding the clitoris the libido of the wife is increased and thus she
is in full marital accord with her husband. 44
The device heightened sexual pleasure for women during intercourse, but this
was not seemingly a sufficient end in and of itself. Instead, clitoral stimulation
was framed as a remedy for a woman's medical anomaly and as a means for
supporting a key cultural institution.
Other patents repeat this theme. U.S. Patent No. 2,559,059 disclosed a
"device[] for promoting marital felicity, and more particularly a device for
stimulating the wife during intercourse to overcome shyness and frigidity." 45
By arousing a woman during sexual intercourse, the ring-like rubber device
would help her "to overcome her frigidity and to assist her in performing with
pleasure her share ofthis essential marital act." 4 6 The patent registry discloses
a diverse range of technologies that could be used to combat frigidity and promote essential marital acts, including clitoral stimulation rings,47 vibrating devices,48 mechanized dildos, 49 and a water-dispensing "relaxation device." 50

42 See Carolyn Herbst Lewis, Waking SleepingBeauty: The PremaritalPelvic Exam and Heterosexuality During the Cold War, 17 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 86, 90 (2005) (noting the misguided factors,
such as "a motherwho was too doting, a father who was too distant,... a wedding night that was less
than tender," that physicians in the 1950s would associate with female sexual wellness).
43 U.S. Patent No. 2,024,983 col. 111. 1-6 (filed Sept. 10, 1934) (issued Dec. 17, 1935).
44 Id at col. 2 11. 3-10.
45 U.S. Patent No. 2,559,059 col. 111. 1-4 (filed Oct. 24, 1949) (issued July 3, 1951).
46 Id. at col. 111. 15-18.
47 See id. at col. 111. 53-55 (describing the "ring" shape of the device).
48 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,978,851 col. 111. 15-17, 28-29, 31-32 (filed Mar. 31, 1975) (issued Sept. 7, 1976) ("[M]any causes of incompatibility between married couples canbe traced directly
to apparent sexual deficiencies . . .. [D]octors and other experts have employed various forms of genital stimulation . . .. Such treatments . . 'train' the sex organs of so called frigid females to function
properly.").
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Frigidity narratives were highly prevalent among the earliest issued patents in the dataset and became relatively less common as competing sexual
narratives emerged and as gender norms evolved. Nonetheless, express references to "frigidity" appear in patents issued within the past decade, 5 ' and echoes of frigidity narratives have continued even after the term itself has gone
out of fashion. For example, U.S. PatentNo. 5,620,429 claims a feminine napkin that can be used for "external" sexual encounters for those times, such as
during menstruation, when "the wife suffers from the feeling of depression
since she cannot satisfy her husband's sexual desire." 52 Additionally, several
recent patents refer to treatment of "Female Sexual Dysfunction" or "Female
Sexual Arousal Disorders"-conditions included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders with roots in Freudian concerns with frigidity.53 As shown in Figure B, below, the rate of frigidity narratives has substantially decreased over time but has not fully disappeared from the discourse of
pleasure patents.5 4

49

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,722,327 col. 111. 12-14 (filed May 14, 1987) (issued Feb. 2, 1988)
("There have always been men and women who are orbecome sexually frigid, impotent, or unable to
practice normal sex for one or more reasons.").
50 U.S. Patent No. 8,157,724 B2 col. 1 11. 10-15 (filed May 11, 2007) (issued Apr. 17, 2012)
("Much more, the modem females being independent, the feelings of emptiness and aloneness are
formed in the life of the mid-age females as to make the females' emotion bad and worried. Besides,
due to the lack of sexual life, the secretion of the female hormone is effected to make the sexual frigidity and the like ascend.").
51 See id.
52 U.S. PatentNo. 5,620,429 col. 111.28-29 (filed June 22, 1995) (issued Apr. 15,
1997); see also
U.S. Patent No. 5,067,480 col. 111. 12-14, 16-18 (filed Mar. 8, 1989) (issued Nov 26, 1991) ("[A]
large percentage of women do not orgasm regularly during sexual intercourse. . . .For a substantial
number of married couples, this can lead to tension and frustration which, in tum, leads to marital
discord.").
5 See Angel, supra note 41, at 537; see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,741,895 B1 col. 111. 55-59 (filed
Oct. 21, 1999) (issued May 25, 2004) ("In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the results of the
measurement may be used to diagnose sexual dysfunction, to determine an appropriate pharmaceutical
regiment and/or for research into cures for sexual dysfunction."); U.S. Patent No. 7,588,533 B2 col. 1
11. 29-35 (filed Nov. 23, 2005) (issued Sept. 15, 2009) ("Individuals who have FSAD can include
women who are bored of sexual routines, receive inadequate stimulation (because of age or partner),
or even have clitoris blood flow or engorgement problems. It is believed that ensuring clitoral tumescence (i.e., engorgement, swelling, and erection) can play an important role in solving FSAD."); U.S.
Patent No. 8,715,161 B2 col. 111. 53-57 (filed Jan. 30, 2011) (issued May 6, 2014) ("Further, surveys
indicate that ten percent (10%) or more women have never been able to achieve orgasm, either alone,
or with a partner. This includes both healthy women, and those with medical conditions, such as Female Sexual Arousal Disorder (FSAD).").
5 See Dataset, supra note 33.
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2. Happy Marriages
Marriage looms large in pleasure patents. In fifty-two ofthe patents in the
dataset, the patentee expressly linked the disclosed invention with facilitating a
successful, happy marriage. Although most ofthe "frigidity" patents discussed
in Subsection 1 emphasize the importance of women's sexual pleasure in fulfilling her expected role within the marital relationship, marriage narratives in
the dataset are often far more gender-egalitarian in their emphasis. The institution of marriage is still framed as an unquestionable social good, but pleasurable sex within marriage is framed as both strengthening that institution and
improving the happiness of those within it.
Throughout the dataset, happy marriages are deeply entwined with pleasurable sex. For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,866,645 B2 discloses a motorized
penetrative device that is "capable of flavoring lives of and building happy
families for married couples, thereby making the community more peaceful
and harmonious."5 5 U.S. Patent No. 3,896,787 discloses a stirrup and shoulder
support device to reduce the amount of physical exertion during sex; it emphasizes that "[n]ormal sexual activity between husband and wife in a marital union
is a very important ingredient for the promotion of marital accord and the maintaining of the desired compatibility between the parties" and notes that sexual
activity "is no less important in a marriage where one of the parties is suffering

5 U.S. Patent No. 6,866,645 B2 col. 111. 8-10 (filed Jan. 24, 2003) (issued Mar. 15, 2005).
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from a disease or a physical impairment."56 U.S. Patent No. 4,488,541 similarly notes that "[s]exual intercourse is generally regarded as being necessary for
the normal enjoyment of life and is particularly important in the maintenance
of a happy and healthy relationship being married people"; it discloses a "flexible pubic shield" that will facilitate such marital bliss.57 On the flip side, without an active, pleasurable sex life, several patents warn of the potential breakdown of the marriage. One patentee noted that "[m]any divorce cases and familial disputes occur during the periods when couples are forced to stop love
making,"58 and another observed that "[w]hile there is controversy on whether
high divorce rates can be attributed solely or perhaps even principally to failure to reach an adequate adjustment [to sexual relations], nevertheless there is
reason to believe that this is a significant factor in many cases."59
It is unsurprising that marriage figures so prominently in pleasure patents.
Monogamous intercourse between married adults has long been the gold
standard for socially acceptable sexual activity-indeed most other forms of
sex have been criminalized at some point in history-and emphasizing the link
between marriage and the disclosed technologies might reduce the social stigma around patented dildos, vibrators, pubic shields, body harnesses, and electro-stimulation devices. 60 These technologies can just as easily facilitate masturbation, extramarital sex, and nonprocreative sex as they can promote marital
intercourse, but patentees may understandably choose to downplay the former
effects and emphasize the latter. Fusing together sexuality with marriage or
marriage-like relationships has been a winning legal strategy for protecting
nontraditional sexual activity in other contexts, 6 1and it appears to have been
an effective strategy in the procurement of patents.
What is perhaps more surprising than the quantity of marriage narratives
in the dataset is the steep decline of these narratives over time. As shown in
Figure C, below, marriage narratives appeared in half of patents issued before
1970, then dropped down to roughly one-third of patents issued in the 1970s
and '80s before declining to only five percent of patents issued between 2010-

U.S. Patent No. 3,896,787 col. 111. 11-14, 15-17 (filed Dec. 18, 1973) (issued July 29, 1975).
5 U.S. Patent No. 4,488,541 col. 111. 11-14, 63 (filed Dec. 9, 1982) (issued Dec. 18, 1984).
58 U.S. Patent No. 5,620,429 col. 111. 36-38 (filed June 22, 1995) (issued Apr. 15, 1997).
59 U.S. Patent No. 3,417,743 col. 111. 34-38 (filed June 23, 1965) (issued Dec. 24, 1968).
60 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 179 ("Doc Johnson marital aids were framed
to keep women
tightly connected to their male partners. Although it's hard to imagine a nine-inch vibrating dong
being bought to improve matrimonial bonds, Doc Johnson's strategy worked.").
61 See Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that Connecticut's ban on contraceptives violated constitutional rights to marital privacy); Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The
Story Behind the Story ofLawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-lithwick [https://penna.cc/438X-FFJ4] (observing that the decision in Lawrence v. Texas "used the word 'relationship' eleven times," even though
the individuals prosecuted for sodomy were not actually in a romantic relationship).
56

2022]

PleasurePatents

5 85

2018.62 Such decline almost certainly reflects changing societal views regarding nonmarital and LGBTQIA sexual activity since the 1970s. But notably, this
decrease predates both the demise of the moral utility doctrine63 in patent law
and landmark Supreme Court decisions, such as Lawrence v Texas,64 involving
sexual privacy and same-sex relationships. The patent system certainly contains indicia of traditional sexual morality, but, as discussed further in Part
111,65 it appears to have moved away from such traditional views far more
quickly than other areas of law.

3. Living Single
With the gradual decline of marriage in the zeitgeist of patented sex toys,
a new problem began to emerge in the 1980s: single people. Whether because
of divorce, 66 death, or the unavailability of desirable monogamous partners,
thirty-four patents in the dataset observed that the disclosed technologies could
See Dataset, supra note 33.
See infra notes 192-198 and accompanying text (elaborating on the moral utility doctrine's
development in U.S. case law); Julien Crockett, Note, Morality: An Important Considerationat the
PatentOffice, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 275 (2020) (defining the moral utility doctrine, rooted in European law, as a criteria for patent approval depending on whether the proposed invention contravened
public benefit, law, or accepted morality).
64 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law criminalizing sex between sex-same couples violated constitutional rights of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
65 See infra Part III.
66
Divorce rates in the United States spiked to an all-time high in 1979. See Frank Olito, How the
Divorce Rate Has Changed Over the Last 150 Years, INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.insider.
com/divorce-rate-changes-over-time-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/WRJ6-U2F7].
62
63
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facilitate the sexual pleasure of single people. One patentee noted that " [i]f one
is single, the best way to fulfill sexual desire is through various sex toys, which
is not only sanitary and convenient, but also results in less complicated sexual
issues."67 Yet another astutely observed, "Dildos enable a person to enjoy
penetration without a partner. "68

'

Patented sexual devices are presented to both single women and single men
as a healthy and satisfying outlet for their sexual desires. For example, U.S. Patent No. 7,513,868 B 1 notes that "a great many women simply have no partners
and do not wish to subject themselves to potential harm from strangers"; it discloses a U-shaped handle that can be attached "to a variety of intra-vaginal
appliances." 69 Another patent discloses a contraption for moving an "artificial
penis" along a mechanized rail system; the patentee described the invention as
"[a] therapeutic apparatus for relieving sexual frustrations in women without
sexual partners" that "simulate [s] the look and feel of an erect human male's
penis." 70 U.S. Patent No. 5,725,473 notes, "Women, for one reason or another,
are not always successful in finding partners who satisfy their sexual drive." 7
A few issued patents reference the concerns of single men. For example, one
patentee noted that its "functional mannequin for use by adult males" could be
particularly useful for people who "for whatever reason, do not have access to
a human female partner."7 2
Although many patents do carry a message of sexual autonomy and selfgratification, as developed further below, providing sex toys for single people
is not entirely divorced from expectations around marriage or compulsory conjugality. Instead of a resource for sexually independent women and men, patented sexual devices are presented as a therapeutic tool for the loneliness and
frustration that accompanies being single. One patentee observed, "Much
more, the modern females being independent, the feelings of emptiness and
aloneness are formed in the life of the mid-age females as to make the females'

U.S. Patent No. 8,641,599 B2 col. 111. 16-18 (filed Sept. 22, 2010) (issued Feb. 4, 2014).
U.S. Patent No. 7,524,283 B1 col. 111. 32-33 (filed Aug. 30, 2005) (issued Apr. 28, 2009); see
also U.S. Patent No. 6,592,516 B2 col. 111. 28-30 (filed Oct. 9, 2001) (issued July 15, 2003) ("[A]n
unmarried person or a person without any sexual partner can satisfy the personal sexual desire with
the sexual delight appliance.").
69 U.S. Patent No. 7,513,868 B 1 col. 111. 26-28, 65-67 (filed May 3, 2007) (issued Apr. 7, 2009).
70 U.S. Patent No. 4,722,327, at [57] (filed May 14, 1987) (issued Feb. 2, 1988).
71 U.S. Patent No. 5,725,473 col. 111. 37-38 (filed Aug. 28, 1995) (issued Mar. 10, 1998).
72 U.S. Patent No. 6,179,795 B1 col. 111.7-8, 18-19 (filed Apr. 26, 1999) (issued Jan. 30, 2001);
see also U.S. Patent No. 5,466,235 col. 111.24-29 (filed Mar. 27, 1995) (issued Nov. 14, 1995) ("Such
mannequins could also be used by people that are incarcerated within jails. Also, such mannequins
could be used by certain individuals within the public such as individuals with certain disabilities or
other individuals that, for whatever reason, do not have access to a human female."); U.S. Patent No.
9,492,345 B2 col. 1 11. 14-17 (filed July 23, 2013) (issued Nov. 15, 2016) ("Prior to the disclosed
invention sexual novelties were expensive, not disposable, and heavy, this made sexual pleasure for
single men and soldiers challenging. The present invention solves these problems.").
67
68
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emotion bad and worried." 73 Solitary use of sex toys is rarely framed as a preference, but instead as compensation for the inability to find the ideal, compatible, long-term relationship. As framed by one patentee, "In terms of sexual
desire, if one has a stable relationship with another person, he/she can relieve
his/her sexual desire and achieve effects of physical and mental health. If one
is single, the best way to fulfill sexual desire is through various sex toys
. . ."74 Solitary, masturbatory uses of sex toys are framed as "a deficiency in
sexual life," 75 suggesting that the utility of the patented devices is to help address the frustration of relying on self-pleasure and the unavailability of a sexual partner.76As shown in Figure D, below, narratives surrounding single people and sex toys emerged for the first time in the 1980s, but have gradually
decreased ever since. 77

Fi
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U.S. Patent No. 8,157,724 B2 col. 111. 10-13 (filed May 11, 2007) (issued Apr. 17, 2012).

74 U.S. Patent No. 8,641,599 B2 col. 111. 13-17 (filed Sept. 22, 2010) (issued Feb. 4, 2014).
75 U.S. Patent No. 4,854,303 col. 111. 14-20 (filed Oct. 21, 1987) (issued Aug. 8, 1989) ("Ac-

cording to the investigative report in 'Redbook' three fourths of the 100,000 women interviewed admitted that they had experienced comfort in masturbation. Based upon this it can be concluded that
women today are attempting to enjoy such self comfort games. According to a psychologist's study
such behavior is due to a kind of compensation for a deficiency in sexual life.").
76 See U.S. Patent No. 6,142,929 col. 1 11. 7-12 (filed Sept. 10, 1999) (issued Nov. 7, 2000)
("Many women have tried to masturbate and failed because of the same reason that one cannot tickle
oneself [sic] This leaves a woman without a partner frustrated and can cause her to seek satisfaction
that is not safe, disease free, non impregnating, or is immoral."); U.S. Patent No. 7,166,072 B2 col. 1
11. 54-56 (filed Aug. 12, 2004) (issued Jan. 23, 2007) ("A vibrator canbe used to assist the disabled or
elderly to induce orgasms after the death, desertion or lack of capacity or availability of a spouse.").
77 See Dataset, supra note 33.
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4. Safe Sex Toys
In the 1980s, when the travails of single people emerged in pleasure patents, so did a frequent concern for safe sex practices and avoiding STIs. Part
of this concern was likely interrelated with the concerns of unmarried people's
sex lives-indeed, nearly half (sixteen) of the patents containing narratives
about single people also contained narratives about STIs. Another major impetus for safe sex narratives was almost certainly the HIV/AIDS epidemic and
the newly heightened risk of sexual activity. By making available new technologies that facilitated sexual pleasure without the exchange of bodily fluids,
patentees were able to respond to changing sexual attitudes and pressing new
social anxieties.78 The AIDS crisis and broader concerns about STI transmission that emerged in the 1980s accordingly provided a new dimension ofutility
for sexual technologies.
The dataset contained thirty-four patents that expressly reference a concern with STI transmission and/or the AIDS crisis. As US Patent No.
6,142,929 explains, "With A.I.D.S. (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)
and numerous other sexually transmitted venereal diseases so prevalent in today's society, there are considerable risks involved in extramarital sex." 79 With
the increased health risks associated with sexual activity-combined with the
continued moral stigma around extramarital sex-the sexual ecosystems of the
1980s and '90s were fertile grounds for inventing and selling new sexual technologies. According to one patentee:
Although condoms have been promoted as one method for protecting oneself against exposure to the A.I.D.S. virus, intercourse utilizing condoms is not 100% safe, even when properly used. The fear of
contracting the A.I.D.S. virus, coupled with the inhibiting and perhaps
demeaning prospect of asking prospective sex partners about his or
her latest sexual contacts, is changing the way many people view their
own human sexuality and their relationships with others.8 0
In this view, patented sex toys accordingly could supplant the need for condoms and open communication. As stated by another patentee, "With the onslaught of venereal diseases such as herpes and AIDS, phalluses substitute for
See U.S. Patent No. 7,056,281 B2 col. 111. 27-35 (filed May 19, 2004) (issued June 6, 2006)
("The use of phallic devices for obtaining sexual pleasure is gaining popularity along with social acceptance. This increased popularity is due to a number of social and environmental factors including:
1) an increase in sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS and the like; 2) an increasingly open
attitude towards human sexuality within our society; and 3) a desire for couples and people who do
not have a sex partner to privately and safely explore a wide variety of sexual experiences.").
78

79 '929 Patent col. 111. 16-19.
80 U.S. Patent No. 4,790,296 col. 111. 28-36 (filed Apr. 10, 1987) (issued Dec. 13, 1988) (disclosing a mechanized penetration device for use with a dildo).
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the male reproductive organ as part of safe sex practices.""' Although a combination of frank communication, condoms, regular testing, and prescription
drugs can substantially, if not entirely, reduce the risk of STI transmission,
numerous patentees emphasized that their inventions could offer an alternative
route to safer sex. 82
As shown in Figure E, below, the frequency of STI narratives shot up in
the 1980s and '90s-reaching 20% of the patents issued in that time periodbefore declining to roughly 5% in the most recent decade. 83 This may be attributable at least in part to the substantial reduction in HIV/AIDS-related
deaths and widespread availability of effective retroviral treatments.

5. Patently Queer
Although many pleasure patents undeniably reinforce traditional sex and
gender norms (as well as emphasize the risks of extramarital sex), patentees
are increasingly framing sexual technologies in terms of facilitating nontraditional forms of sexual and gender expression. Several patents cite to growing
acceptance around non-heterosexual sex, and even expressly place their invention in the context of landmark LGBTQIA rights victories, such as the Su' U.S. Patent No. 5,127,396 col. 111. 37-39 (filed May 30, 1991) (issued July 7, 1992); see also
U.S. Patent No. 5,690,604 col. 111. 15-18 (filed Mar. 22, 1996) (issued Nov. 25, 1997) ("Recently,
the increase in serious sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS has made the use of phallic devices
even more common because they may be used as a penis substitute in safe sex practices.").
" See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,203,491 B1 col. 111. 10-13 (filed May 6, 1999) (issued Mar. 20,
2001) ("The awareness of pervasive sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS have made the use of
adult sex toys more common because they may be used as a sex substitute in safe sex practices.").
83 See Dataset, supra note 33.
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preme Court's same-sex marriage cases. 84 As shown below in Figure F, although LGBTQIA people were not mentioned in the dataset before the 1990s,
narratives around LGBTQIA sex have come to occupy a small but significant
portion (seven percent) of the most recently issued pleasure patents.85
Several patentees expressly mention that the claimed inventions could
improve the sex lives of same-sex couples or facilitate nontraditional gender
identities and expression. For example, a patented "machine for achieving sexual satisfaction" was designed for use by "a woman alone; a woman with a
male partner; a woman with a female partner; a man alone; or a man with a
male partner."1 6 Another invention, a novel harness to be worn around the pelvis, was meant to respond to potential "difficulties . .. within female same-sex
couples related to difficulty achieving orgasm.. .. For example, during face to
face positions .... "87 Some patents expressly mention that they could facilitate
the sexual pleasure of transgender people,"" and others disclose the use of the
technologies in gender-nonconforming ways. For example, some patents discuss opportunities for heterosexual men to enjoy the experience of submission

See U.S. Patent No. 9,510,995 B1 (filed Jan. 20, 2016) (issued Dec. 6, 2016) ("Perhaps our
[Supreme Court]'s 2015 marriage ruling was a societal milestone regarding prudish 1950s sexual
bigotries .... ") (referring to Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)); see also U.S. Patent No.
10,206,849 B2 col. 111. 31-34 (filed July 10, 2015) (issued Feb. 19, 2019) (observing that"[s]exual
liberation included increased acceptance of sex outside of traditional heterosexual, monogamous relationships (primarily marriage)").
85 See Dataset, supra note 33.
86 U.S. Patent No. 6,142,929 col. 111. 38-41 (filed Sept. 10, 1999) (issued Nov. 7, 2000); see also
U.S. Patent No. 7,530,944 B1 col. 111. 48-50 (filed Mar. 14, 2008) (issued May 12, 2009) ("A further
object of this invention is to provide a device that is capable of being used by partners of the same sex
or of the opposite sex.").
87 U.S. Patent No. 8,109,869 B2 col. 111. 19-23 (filed May 12, 2009) (issued Feb. 7, 2012); see
also U.S. Patent No. 8,371,999 B2 col 1. 11. 26-34 (filed Sept. 21, 2009) (issued Feb. 12, 2013)
("Modernly, sexual aids have been developed which may be employed by one user or two parties
during sexual intercourse betweenthem. . . .Such devices however employ straps and belts and other
inconvenient components to remain mounted on the one female while being employed upon the other.
They are as such, uncomfortable and inconvenient."); U.S. Patent No. 8,876,695 B2 col. 3.11. 44-49
(filed Oct. 1, 2010) (issued Nov. 4, 2014) ("The invention can also be used simultaneously by two
women sitting across from each other and sliding the dildo to the bottom of the foot-sleeve dildo harness where they can insert the dildo into each other's vaginas, while using their toes for further clitoral
stimulation."); '995 B1 Patent col. 3 11.47-50 ("And if Jean were, for example, in a lesbian relationship with a girlfriend named Charlene, the present inventions provide a rabbit so Jean will feel (more)
pleasure while banging Charlene with the dildo.").
88 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,853,362 col. 1 11. 39-43 (filed June 28, 1997) (issued Dec. 29,
1998) ("Dildos and the related items described above are used by individuals of either sex, by
transgendered (sex-changed) persons, and by couples (both heterosexual and homosexual) to give
sexual pleasure to each other, either in lieu of or in addition to vaginal/penile or other modes of sexual
congress."); U.S. Patent No. 9,101,497 B2 col. 2 11. 45-50 (filed Apr. 16, 2012) (issued Aug. 11,
2015) ("[A]nother group of individuals who are also reliant on artificial penises are transsexuals or
transgendered persons . . who are unable, either due to medical or financial reasons, to undergo a
complete or successful sex reassignment procedure that includes phalloplasty.").
84
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and/or penetration.89 Another patent, which discloses a pair of pants with an
attachment point for a dildo, asserts that the invention might "appeal to a lady
who fancies her clitoris and also having a penis." 90 Accordingly, for several
patentees, the utility of their claimed inventions is directly tied to changing sex
and gender norms and the new opportunities that such societal changes have
opened up for queer play, experimentation, and pleasure.

6. Pleasure for Pleasure's Sake
Many of the earliest pleasure patents emphasize that the utility of sexual
pleasure lies in its furtherance of socially-valuable activities like successful
marriages, reproduction, or public health. In more recent years, however, patentees have increasingly moved away from instrumental understandings of
sexual pleasure. Rather than framing sexual pleasure in terms of preventing

89 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,993,377 col. 111. 5-8 (filed Jan. 23, 1998) (issued Nov. 30, 1999)
("The present invention is directed toward a sexual aid for increasing the sexual pleasure of both men
and women during orgasm and more particularly toward a sexual aid in the form of anal beads .... ");
U.S. Patent No. 7,056,281 B2 col. 111. 19-21 (filed May 19, 2004) (issued June 6, 2006) ("The phallic
device is an elongate object sized and shaped to be inserted into the vagina of a woman and/or the
anus of a person.").
90 U.S. Patent No. 10,123,571 B2 col. 1411. 56-57 (filed Apr. 5, 2017) (issued Nov. 13, 2018).
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divorces or STIs, patentees tend to gravitate toward presenting sexual pleasure,
particularly women's sexual pleasure, as intrinsically valuable. 9
Numerous patentees have emphasized a growing societal embrace of women's sexual empowerment. As succinctly stated in a patent granted in 2001,
"Addressing women's sexuality concerns is no longer taboo." 92 And as women's sexuality becomes less of a taboo topic, the opportunity arises to correct
misunderstandings about women's pleasure. 93 For example, one patent introduces its innovation by stating: "A percentage of females are stimulated by
vaginal stimulation and others by clitoral stimulation. Presently there are no
known devices or male organs that can stimulate both simultaneously and conveniently." 94 Indeed, many patents frankly and explicitly discuss topics such as
increasing women's pleasure during masturbation or sexual pleasure after
menopause. One patent proposes a "prosthetic device [that] enables women in
experimenting and becoming much more open and conversant with midlife
mental, physical and sexual sensations and changes in sexual response, allowing certain users to get the most out of 'postmenopausal zest. "'95 These patents
not only cite to these themes of sexual empowerment, but they also explain in
a straightforward and thorough manner how the claimed invention interacts
with a woman's anatomy. 96 Some adopt a more jocular tone, such as one that
91 See U.S. Patent No. 6,997,888 B2 col. 111. 15-18 (filed July 8, 2002) (issued Feb. 14, 2006)
("Satisfactory sexual relations are now recognized as a very important part of a healthy lifestyle both
with respect to social interactions and with respect to physical well being.").
92 U.S. Patent No. 6,224,541 B1 col 1 11. 18-19 (filed Oct. 7, 1999) (issued May 1, 2001); see
also U.S. Patent No. 6,863,649 B2 col. 5 11. 23-24 (filed Apr. 25, 2001) (issued Mar. 8, 2005) ("In
addition, an object is to improve a feeling of sexual pleasure given to a female.").
93 See U.S. Patent No. 7,166,072 B2 col. 111. 60-65 (filed Aug. 12, 2004) (issued Jan. 23, 2007)
("In the past, vibrators were frequently phallic-shaped to simulate the movement of the husband's sexual
organ. This kind of vibrator is possibly the result of male misunderstanding of the process of the female
orgasm since direct clitoral pressure is the method of choice for marital orgasmic therapy.").
94 U.S. Patent No. 8,419,611 B1 col. 111. 30-33 (filed Sept. 24, 2009) (issued Apr. 16, 2013).
95 U.S. Patent No. 7,527,589 B2 col. 111. 29-33 (filed Nov. 12, 2007) (issued May 5, 2009); see
also U.S. Patent No. 6,749,557 B2 col. 2 11. 10-15 (filed Sept. 30, 2002) (issued June 15, 2004)
("[T]he present invention essentially comprises modifications to sex aid systems to provide new and
improved systems for use in avoiding irritation or pain during sexual activities or during self stimulated sex activities, while concomitantly increasing the pleasure of the users or user."); U.S. Patent No.
8,033,985 B2 col. 1. 11. 12-16 (filed Sept. 12, 2007) (issued Oct. 11, 2011) ("The present invention
relates to a sexual stimulation apparatus . . . designed for use by women to increase their personal
comfort when using the sexual stimulation apparatus during masturbation."); U.S. Patent No.
8,512,226 B2 col. 111. 16-19 (filed Dec. 20, 2007) (issued Aug. 20, 2013) ("As the muscles of the
vaginal wall lose their tautness and as the vagina enlarges so that vaginal tightness decreases, the
female may experience a decrease in sexual satisfaction and sensation.").
96 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,081,087 B2 col. 211.26-29, 33-37 (filed Feb. 5, 2004) (issued July
25, 2006) ("It is further an object of the present invention to provide an improved sexual aid device
that can be easily inserted into a selected body cavity and manually self-manipulated when in supine
position.... The curved portion and the substantially straight portion are structured and arranged such
that when the curved portion is inserted within the vagina the straight portion extends in direction
towards the user's torso."); U.S. Patent No. 7,335,175 B2, at [57] (filed Dec. 18, 2004) (issued Feb.
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claims "there are very few natural penises so talented as to alternatively grow
and shrink in length to any substantive degree while inserted in a vagina." 97
But overall, what emerges from the patent database is not just a set of narratives about the intrinsic importance of women's pleasure, but also a fairly detailed education about, potentially, how to bring about such pleasure within
women's bodies. 98
As shown in Figure Q below, sexual empowerment narratives have increased dramatically over the past two decades, appearing in approximately
one-third of recently granted patents in the dataset. 99 Sexual empowerment has
accordingly emerged as the most prevalent theme around sexual pleasure. This
presents a remarkable shift in the narrative emphasis of pleasure patents. The
majority of pleasure patents granted before 1980 presented sexual pleasure as
solving the societal problems of fragile marriages and/or a women's inability
to perform their marital duties. By contrast, pleasure patents granted in the past
decade frame sexual pleasure as the goal in and of itself. As the total number
of pleasure patents issued per year has skyrocketed since the 1970s (see Figure
A), so too has both the number and frequency of patents that emphasize the
intrinsic importance of sexual pleasure. As summarized by one patentee, "People are continually striving to devise more creative activities for deriving
pleasure. The sexual device industry is fast becoming a significant market

26, 2008) ("A portable hydro massage device for submersion in a body of water containing a female
user, i.e. a bathtub, provides a local massage to the labium region and a focused stimulant to the female user's clitoris thereby resulting in a superior sensation to the entire body promoting an overall
euphoric state and calming effect.").
97 U.S. Patent No. 6,902,525 BI col. 2 11. 19-21, col. 4 11. 15-21 (filed Dec. 30, 2003) (issued
June 7, 2005) ("For all these reasons there exists a need for a device that provides both rotary and
linear reciprocating activation of sexual devices used by both males and females for the purpose of
sexual stimulation. Such a device would be desirable only if it couldbe convenient, simple and safe, easy
to handle, light and small, yet powerful and still be modestly priced, rugged, reliable and satisfying.").
98 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,179,775 B1 col. 1 11. 14-20 (filed July 1, 1999) (issued Jan. 30,
2001) ("The clitoris is the female structure analogous to the male penis and is primarily responsible
for the female sexual response and her excitation. As with the male penis, the clitoris contains both
sensory nerves and erectile tissue. The erectile tissue is responsible forthe enlargement of the clitoris,
two to four-fold as the clitoris engorges withblood during the arousal phase of female sexual stimulation."); U.S. Patent No. 7,998,056 B2 col. 111. 10-14 (filed Jan. 20, 2005) (issued Aug. 16, 2011) ("It
is well known that for women sexual fulfillment in coitus is largely dependent on the state and control
of the muscles of the pelvic floor. Various attempts have been made to train these muscles by means
of devices which are introduced into the vagina."); U.S. Patent No. 8,579,837 B1 col. 1 11. 30-35
(filed Apr. 30, 2013) (issued Nov. 12, 2013) ("Clitoral vascular engorgement plays an important role
in female sexual desire, arousal and satisfaction. Sexual arousal results in smooth muscle relaxation
and arterial vasodilation within the clitoris. The resultant increase in blood flow leads to tumescence
of the glans clitoris and increased sexual arousal.").
99 See Dataset, supra note 33.
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force, and the styles and varieties of sexual aids is limited only by the imagina"100
tion.

Fiur

a
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7. Other Notable Narratives (Disability, Medicine, Crime, History)
The previous Subsections closely examined prominent sexual narratives
that emerged in the dataset as well as their shifting prevalence over time. There
are some additional sexual narratives worth noting, but that don't appear to
follow any particular changes in social norms over time.
One prominent narrative that surfaced in the dataset concerned the relationship between sexual pleasure and disability. Numerous patents state that
they would be useful for improving the sexual pleasure ofpeople with disabilities, in particular where a given physical condition might make it difficult to
engage in sexual intercourse or masturbation.' 0' U.S. Patent No. 7,452,326 B2
observes that "persons with physical disabilities . . retain their needs and desires to experience and respond to such non-tactile stimuli in a physical manner. Examples of such experiences and responses include sexual pleasure and
" U.S. Patent No. 7,246,781 B2 col. 111. 9-13 (filed Aug. 29, 2003) (issued July 24, 2007); see
also U.S. PatentNo. 9,510,995 B1 col. 1 1. 25 (filed Jan. 20, 2016) (issued Dec. 6, 2016) (asserting in
the Field of Art description for "dildo-rabbutt gear for lesbians, pegging and masturbation" that,
"[s]ocietal-wise, the Field of Art has become less 'taboo"').
101 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,430,990 col. 1 11. 14-17 (filed May 27, 1982) (issued Feb. 14,
1984) ("Such devices find particular application where one of the partners suffers a physical impairmentor limitation which might otherwise inhibit conjugal relations."); U.S. Patent No. 5,538,011 col.
111. 20-23 (filed Jan. 13, 1995) (issued July 23, 1996) ("[L]ittle if any furniture is available to be used
by individuals suffering from medical conditions which renders it difficult or impossible to engage in
sexual relations in conventional ways."); U.S. Patent No. 5,782,243 col. 111. 17-20 (filed July 25,
1997) (issued July 21, 1998) ("It is also well known that many handicapped individuals desire to be
sexually active. Unfortunately, their physical handicaps often limit their sexual activity and the number of positions that may used during sexual intercourse."); U.S. Patent No. 6,691,709 B2 col. 111.
12-15 (filed Dec. 19, 2001) (issued Feb. 17, 2004) (noting that some disabled people may "find difficulty in conjugality at normal physical posture, for example, due to physical defects including armless
or legless disability").
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gratification.", 0 2 As shown in Figure H, below, such narratives appear relatively constant throughout the time period covered by the dataset, compared with
other frequent sexual narratives. 03

The consistent appearance of disability narratives throughout the dataset
might seem surprising. Disability scholars critique the frequent portraits of
disabled people as asexual,104 or incapable of desiring sex;'10 5 and yet the sexual needs and wants of disabled people appear in seven to eighteen percent of
pleasure patents. Nonetheless, such prevalence has a few potential explanations. First, as illustrated in Halle Lieberman's history of the sex toy, disabled
people in the 1970s were instrumental in the commercialization of sexual technologies. 06 Second, disability narratives can serve to reinforce othernarratives
in the dataset. To the extent that disabled individuals are matred heterosexuals, the patented inventions can help those disabled individuals meet heter-

02

U.S. Patent No. 7,452,326 B2 col. 2 11. 12-18 (filed Oct. 13, 2006) (issued Nov. 18, 2008).

T0 See Dataset, supra note 33.
104 See, e.g., Russell Shuttleworth, Introduction to Special Issue: CriticalResearch and Policy
Debates in Disability and Sexuality Studies, 4 SEXUALITY RSCH. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 4 (2007) (Disa-

bled people] are often infantilized and accorded the same sexual status reserved for children that is,
an asexual one." (citations omitted)); TOM SHAKESPEARE, KATH GILLESPIE-SELLS &DOMINIC DAVIES, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD DESIRES 9(1996) ("The neglect of sexual politics within the disability movement, and its absence within disability literature, mirors the wider
attitudes of society to disabled people's sexuality.").
105 See, e.g., Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and ncapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1220
(2015) (exploring notions of incapacity and sexual consent, and noting that some believe certain
"classes[es] of individuals [canbe] deemed to lack sexual consent capacity" based on mental health or
other disability).
106

See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 93 (telling the origin story of Gosnell Duncan, a young man

disabled in an accident, spurring inspiration for the unique role of sexual devices for the disabled
community).
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onormative standards. 0 7 To the extent that sex toys are framed as medical or
therapeutic, disabled people can stand in as individuals who can benefit especially from these innovations.108 And finally, to the extent that disabled people
are using sexual technologies as means of asserting their own sexual agency,
these stories dovetail with the empowerment narratives deployed on behalf of
women and LGBTQIA people. 109
Another recurrent narrative involves the history of sex toys. Several patentees place their invention in a long historical line of products used by individuals to bring about sexual pleasure. One patentee emphasizes, "Various
types of sexual aids for use in sexual stimulation have been in use since the
dawn of man."" 0 Another patentee traced sex toys back to ancient Greece and
the Upper Paleolithic period." ' As noted in a patent issued in 1992, "Phalluses
(or phalli) have been used as penis substitutes from time immemorial"; for example, "[i]n cultures where hymenal blood was considered evil or dangerous,"
a young bride's hymen would be "pierced by a substitute for the husband, often a phallus made of stone, metal, ivory or even wood."" 2 Although such
documentation of the long history of phalluses and other sexual technologies
might seem to diminish the novelty and non-obviousness ofthe claimed invention, these narratives might serve some countervailing functions. First, they
might legitimize the field of invention-the relevant art-in the eyes of the
USPTO. As some patentees note, this field has been taboo in the United States,
but a wider historical lens might make the inventive activity in question seem a
little less strange and/or immoral. Second, by providing some historical con10 7

See Shuttleworth, supra note 104, at 2 ("[U]ntil about 20 years ago, disability and sexuality research was focused primarily on the loss of sexual function by White heterosexual men who became
impaired in early to middle adulthood . . .. Obscured behind the aura of science were racist, masculinist, and heterosexist biases that reflected an obsession with recuperating the lost phallic power of the
majority.").
108
See Carol Gill, Commentary, DisabilityandSexuality Research: Sufferingfrom a Case ofthe
MedicalModel, DISABILITY STUD. Q., Summer 1989, at 12, 14 (directing inquiries forfuture research
on how to improve "sexual fulfillment and minimize barriers to intimacy" for disabled people during
sex).
109
See Russell P. Shuttleworth, Disabilityand Sexuality, in SEXUAL INEQUALITIES AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 174, 192 (Niels Teunis & Gilbert H. Herdt eds., 2007) (suggesting "a strong coalition between feminists, the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender movement, and disabled people-a coalition that contests narrow and binary constructions of sexual and gender identity").
" U.S. Patent No. 7,513,868 B1 col. 111. 13-14 (filed May 3, 2007) (issued Apr. 7, 2009); see
also U.S. Patent No. 8,371,999 B2 col. 111. 21-23 (filed Sept. 21, 2009) (issued Feb. 12, 2013) ("Sexual aids for increasing and inducing sexual pleasure have been known and employed in different cultures for hundreds of years.").
" U.S. Patent No. 9,498,404 B2 col. 111. 42-44 (filed Sept. 26, 2013) (issued Nov. 22, 2016).
112 U.S. Patent No. 5,127,396 col. 111. 9-15 (filed May 30, 1991) (issued July 7, 1992); see also
U.S. Patent No. 5,993,377 col. 111. 10-13 (filed Jan. 23, 1998) (issued Nov. 30, 1999) ("Anal beads,
per se, have been known and used for many centuries as a sex aid to increase sexual pleasure. While
no one, of course, knows for certainty, the common belief is that such devices originated with the
ancient Chinese.").
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text, patentees can emphasize that there really is a problem to be solved; for centuries, inventors have tried to improve sexual pleasure (for a variety of reasons),
yet there remain significant barriers to sexual pleasure for many people."1 3
A third narrative connects sexual pleasure to a range of seemingly disconnected social activities-most notably: crime. Several patents argue that
through the use of sex toys, individuals can obtain a safe and lawful sexual
release, leading to a reduction in sexual assault and prostitution. 114 Through
increasing sexual pleasure, patentees accordingly improve the emotional wellbeing of individuals who might otherwise engage in a range of socially reprehensible or criminal activities. This narrative therefore presents a highly instrumental approach to sexual pleasure.
Finally, numerous patents subsume sexual pleasure within medical narratives. Rather than place sexuality front and center with respect to a device that
massages the genital area, patentees present their inventions primarily as a way
of addressing nonsexual medical needs, such as urinary incontinence. 1s Although it is likely that many of these patentees really are primarily concerned
with alleviating incontinence, it is also highly likely that the patentee is trying
to bury the sexual possibilities of the vibrator or phallus in question. This medical subterfuge might be deemed a "Sharper Image" approach to sexual technologies-obviously sexual vibrators are marketed as "personal massagers"

113
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 124 (describing how sex toy sellers in the 1970s included
"a concise history of sex toys" in product catalogs).
114 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,592,516 B2 col. 111.
30-38 (filed Oct. 9, 2001) (issued July 15,
2003) ("If it is viewed from the positive significance, the sexual delight appliance can eliminate the
sex drive of the youngster and decrease the occurrence of sexual crime . . . . Thus, the police departments in each country have not looked up the sexual delight appliance as a salacious article gradually."); U.S. Patent No. 7,753,895 B2 col. 111. 22-27 (filed Aug. 6, 2007) (issued July 13, 2010) ("Simple sperm collecting apparatuses . . can satisfy various social needs, such as prevention of sex-related
crimes [and] antiprostitution activities .... "); U.S. Patent No. 6,179,774 B1 col. 1 11. 22-25 (filed
Apr. 20, 1999) (issued Jan. 30, 2001) ("Such individuals need a convenient, portable, easy to use
means of partnerless sexual release, thereby preventing the urges to engage inunsafe or evenpossibly
illegal sexual activity.").
115 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,881,526 col. 1 11. 8-10 (filed May 27, 1988) (issued Nov. 21,
1989) ("The present invention relates generally to apparatus for intravaginal stimulationforuse inthe
therapy of female urinary incontinence."); U.S. Patent No. 6,030,338 col. 2 11. 61-66 (filed May 14,
1998) (issued Feb. 29, 2000) ("In accordance withthe present invention, there is provided an external
exercising device which is positionable upon the crotch of a patient to identify target muscle groups
responsible for fecal and/or urinary continence and provide a signal to the patient to perform the appropriate muscle strengthening exercises therefor."); see also U.S. Patent No. 3,547,102 col. 111. 9-13
(filed Oct. 28, 1968) (issued Dec. 15, 1970) ("In many branches of scientific research, including veterinary medicine, and clinical medicine, it is necessary to collect and diagnose sperm and post-ejaculatory
urine. Recent medical research has shown the use of sperm to have therapeutic properties in the treatment of cancer."); U.S. Patent No. 4,033,338 col. 111. 19-23 (filed June 4, 1976) (issued July 5, 1977)
("It is an object of the present invention to provide a vacuum cleaning device having an intake portion
proportioned for insertion into the vaginal tract and configured for removing debris from the walls of
the vagina.").

Boston College Law Review

5 98

[Vol. 63 :57 1

with potential to reduce tension in any part of the body."1 6 As discussed below,
the Sharper Image approach was dominant in both the patenting and marketing
practices of the earliest vibrators released at the turn of the twentieth century,1 7 and medicalization narratives have been central to constitutional challenges to sex toy prohibitions.1"8 Given how strategically useful these medicalization narratives have been in other areas, " it is unsurprising to see such narratives deployed in favor of patenting. What is perhaps more surprising is just
how many patents do not rely on the medical or therapeutic potential of sexual
technologies, but instead place these technologies into a broad, diverse ecosystem of sexual possibilities.
II. PLEASURE PATENTS AND THE LAW OF THE SEX TOY

Outside of patent law, much of the legal system has been overtly hostile
toward technologies that facilitated nonprocreative, nonmarital sex. Since at
least the mid-1800s, such devices-now colloquially referred to as "sex
toys"-were treated harshly by the federal, state, and local legal systems. Sex
outside ofmarriage-including masturbation-was frequently unlawful in this
period, and sex toys were often intricately linked with such illegal sex acts.
This Part provides an overview of the laws governing sex toys from the mid1800s until the present day. In doing so, it highlights how historically anomalous pleasure patents are, not just within the field of patent law, but within the
U.S. legal system more broadly.
The first prominent legal battles over sex toys emerged following the discovery of vulcanized rubber in the mid-1800s and the proliferation of rubber
goods that followed in the late-nineteenth century. Vulcanized rubber permitted
the first commercially viable condoms and pessaries, and lent itself well to sex
toys like dildos and clitoral stimulators. 2 0 This era also saw the emergence of
an anti-vice movement within the United States, and the enactment of socalled Comstock laws--obscenity statutes named for anti-vice crusader and
116
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 273 (recounting a scene in the television show Sex andthe
City where Samantha tries to return her vibrator to Sharper Image, but is informed by the manager that
Sharper Image doesn't sell "sex toys").
"1 See id at 178 ("[G]iving sex toys a medical sheen is an old American tradition dating back to
the 19th and early 20th centuries when butt plugs, vaginal dilators, and vibrators had been sold as
medical devices as a way to get around obscenity prosecutions.").
118 See infra Part III.
11 9
See Susan Reid, Sex, Drugs, andAmericanJurisprudence:The MedicalizationofPleasure,37
VT. L. REv. 47, 49, 51 (2012) (endorsing an individual rights-based legal strategy rooted in the
"health-related" aspects of pleasure-seeking to overcome the recognized state interest in advancing
public morality).
120 See LEVINS, supra note 23, at 69-74; LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 28; AMY WERBEL, LUST

ON TRIAL: CENSORSHIP AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN OBSCENITY IN THE AGE OF ANTHONY COM-

STOCK 78 (2018).
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U.S. Postal Inspector Anthony Comstock.' 2' Although the primary focus of the
anti-vice crusade was pornographic books, photographs, and illustrations, suppressing sex toys was also an integral part of the Comstock agenda. In 1868,
New York enacted an obscenity statute that prohibited a litany of "obscene and
indecent" materials, including "Articles of Indecent or Immoral Use" as well
as the advertisements that facilitated their sale. 22 In 1873, Congress enacted
the Comstock Act, a similar law that prohibited the mailing of these indecent
and immoral articles.1 2 3 In a speech on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, Representative Clinton Merriam observed that "wherever these
books go . .. there you will ever find, as almost indispensable, a complete list
of rubber articles for masturbation or for the professed prevention of conception." 2 4 Indeed, by the time Congress passed the Comstock Act, Comstock
himself had seized a large number of rubber dildos, including twelve molds
from a single individual "whose principal business was the manufacture of the
articles for self-pollution, for use by females." 2 5 Comstock observed, "The
extent to which articles for self-pollution are proved to be manufactured suggests a phase of depravity heretofore little suspected."1 26 By 1874, Comstock
had already seized "60,300 articles made of rubber for immoral purposes."127
Comstock laws were enforced against the interstate distribution of sex toys
until the late-twentieth century and remain on the books to this day.1 2 8
Against the backdrop of the Comstock laws, it may seem surprising that the
turn of the twentieth century saw the proliferation and widespread promotion of
121 See WERBEL, supra note 120, at 51-52 ("Since childhood, Comstock
had seen himself as a
"Soldier of the Cross" .... [His] first foray into cleaning up [New York]'s gargantuan vice industry
occurred as early as 1868...."); see also Anthony Comstock, Vampire Literature, 153 N. AM. REV.
160, 167 (1891) ("It seems exceedingly fitting just at this time, when there are so many of these cheap
novels . . that we should consider not only the effects of this sensual matterupon the twenty millions
of youth in this country, but also the legal principles which govern this very important subject.").
1
2 WERBEL, supra note 120, at 54-55, 67-68 (prohibiting "any obscene and indecentbook, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, lithograph, engraving, daguerreotype, photograph, stereoscopic picture, model, cast, instrument or article of indecent use, or articles of medicines for the prevention of
conception or procuring of abortion" (quoting Act of Apr. 28, 1868, ch. 430, 1868 N.Y. Laws 856)).
123 Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); WERBEL, supra note 120, at 67-68.
124 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 168 (1973); see WERBEL, supra note 120, at 68 (discussing
the significance
of the law as the first to explicitly prohibit "lustful arousal outside of marriage").
12
5WERBEL, supra note 120, at 77 (quoting Private and Confidential Report, Bd. of Dirs., YMCA
(Nov. 21, 1872) (on file with YMCA Greater N.Y., Kautz Fam. archive)).
126 Id. at 78 (quoting Private and Confidential Report, supra note
125).
127 Id. at 90 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted); see also LEVINS, supra note 23, at
74-77.
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 ("Every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for
producing
abortion, or for any indecent or immoral use . . [i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not
be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier."); id. § 1465
(Whoever knowingly produces with the intent to transport, distribute, or transmit in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
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another device that is now closely associated with so-called self-pollution: the
vibrator. Following advances in electrical engineering and increased deployment
of home electricity, electric vibrators were advertised in a variety of mainstream
commercial offerings, including the Sears & Roebuck Catalog.1 2 9 Although the
sexual possibilities ofthe vibrator were perhaps an open secret, vibrators evaded
the scorn of law enforcement because providers presented them to the public as
a potential treatment for a wide range of ailments.1 30 In other words, the Sharper Image strategy deployed in some pleasure patents long predates the Sharper
Image catalog itself. For example, one vibrator advertisement touted "Vibratory Massage for every Member of the Family," and recommended the vibrator
"to beautify the complexion, remove wrinkles, develop and strengthen the tissues, and by naturally stimulating the circulation invigorate the system, quicken the pulse, tone the muscles, stimulate the brain and bring about that delightful sensation of renewed energy that is necessary for an active, useful, happy
life."' 3' Vibrators were marketed as "Aids That Every Woman Appreciates,"
alongside sewing machines and meat grinders.1 3 2 As to more explicit sexual
use, some researchers argue that doctors during the early-twentieth century
commonly used electric vibrators to treat "hysteria"-a condition closely historically connected to women's supposed "frigidity"' 33-by stimulating orgasms in female patients; other researchers, however, question the prevalence
of this practice.1 34 Yet by the 1930s, the appearance of vibrators in pornographic films cemented their association with sex, causing the commercial sales and
advertising of vibrators to dissipate, at least until the 1960s. Even today, the
most mainstream electronics companies, like Hitachi and Sharper Image, market popular vibrators as all-purpose "personal massage[]" devices, rather than
embrace the obvious connection to sex.13 5
129 Vibrators Were Sold in the Sears & Roebuck Catalogue, FORGOTTEN HIST. BLOG, https://
forgottenhistoryblog.com/vibrators-were-sold-in-the-sears-roebuck-catalogue/ [https://perma.cc/35AHUH2P] (displaying images of old vibrator advertisements).
130 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 32 (confirming that in the nineteenth century "companies
marketed [vibrators] as medical and household appliances").
131 Vibrators Were Sold in the Sears & Roebuck Catalogue, supra note 129.
132 See 11 Vintage VibratorAds to Make You GladYou Didn'tLive Back Then, VINTAGE EVERYDAY (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.vintag.es/2017/04/11-vintage-vibrator-ads-to-make-you.html [https://
perma.cc/5PBV-SMSV] (advertising one vibrator saying, "[w]henyou're fatigued, 'out of sort,' have
a nervous headache or a touch of rheumatism, you will find electric massage a wonderful help").
133 See, e.g., Cecily Devereux, Hysteria, Feminism, and GenderRevisited: The Case of the Sec-

ond Wave, ENG. STUD. CAN., Mar. 2014, at 19, 19-20 (noting that these female-specific conditions
were often cited as "'evidence' of both the instability of the female mind and the social function of
women defined in relation to their reproductive capacity").
134 See Hallie Lieberman & Eric Schatzberg,A FailureofAcademic Quality Control: The Technology of Orgasm, 4 J. POSITIVE SEXUALITY 24, 25 (2018) (asserting that there is "no evidence" of
doctors employing electric vibrators to incite female orgasm as a valid medical technique).
135 See, e.g., Our Story . . , MAGIC WAND, https://magicwandoriginal.com/ [https://perma.cc/
MCE2-Z2WD] (displaying avibrator advertisement); PersonalMassagers,SHARPER IMAGE, https://

20221

PleasurePatents

601

In the 1960s and '70s, advances in latex production and an emergent sexual revolution created an atmosphere ripe for the production and sale of dildos,
vibrators, and a wide range of other sexual apparatuses-a cultural and commercial environment reflected in our study of pleasure patents. The broader
legal landscape, however, remained an obstacle for the growing sex toy market.1 36 Obscenity laws from the Comstock era remained on the books and enabled seizure of these allegedly obscene devices by law enforcement. For example, in 1969, in People v Clark, the Criminal Court ofthe City of New York
held that "a realistic, rigid plastic replica of the male organ in a state of erection commonly known as a 'dildo"' was obscene under both state and federal
obscenity laws.1 37 In 1962, in UnitedStates v Gentile, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland similarly found that the sale of rubber penile "extensions" violated federal obscenity laws; these extensions were "designed and
adapted for indecent and prurient use in stimulating desire for such intercourse,
that they [went] substantially beyond customary limits of decency."1 38 In 1970,
Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act containing an anti-pandering
law that allowed anyone in receipt of a mailed advertisement they considered
"erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to report it to the post office and
request that a "prohibitory order" be sent to the mailer.1 39 Notably, none of
these federal interventions acknowledged the growing body of federallyincentivized sexual technologies, and none of the pleasure patents
acknowledge this parallel legal universe.
As the number of inventors seeking and obtaining nationwide property
rights in sexual technologies grew, local, state, and federal law enforcement
undertook concerted efforts to shut down commerce in sex toys. The New York
Police Department, for example, regularly surveilled sex shops, seized mer-

www.sharperimage.com/si/view/category/Personal+Massagers/301022?mainCatld=100023 [https://
perma.cc/6HH5-NLZA] (same).
136
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 42-43 (recognizing that "[i]n America in the 1960s, a person couldn't legally send contraceptives . . throughthe mail" and even birth control was only available to married women).
13' 304 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328, 329 (Crim. Ct. 1969); see also People v. Buckley, 320 N.Y.S.2d 91,
96-97 (Crim. Ct. 1971) ("The sale of the varied sex articles and devices, and particularly those devices known as 'dildoes,' has been held to constitute prohibited 'obscene material' .... Advertisements,
both graphic and written (both are contained in the accused material) offering for sale such articles
and devices also constitute 'obscene material' within the ambit of the laws' prohibitions and are violative of such laws. ... "), aff'd mem., 340 N.Y. S.2d 191 (App. Term 1972) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom.
People v. Heller, 307 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted).
13 211 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Md. 1962).
139 Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 748 (1970)
(codified at 39 U.S.C.
§ 3008(a)); see Rowanv. U.S. Post Off. Dep't, 397 U.S. 728,733-34 (1970) (discussingthe congressional intent and legislative developments surrounding anti-pandering laws); see also LIEBERMAN,
supra note 18, at 101.
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chandise, and prosecuted their purveyors. 4 0 The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) aggressively pursued the largest national distributors of sex toys
and brought obscenity charges in multiple culturally conservative jurisdictions.141 Then in 1973, the Supreme Court handed down a decision on obscenity law inMiller v California142 that seemed to carve out space for the growing
social acceptability of sex toys. But with this apparent carveout, the Court emphasized that courts should assess potentially obscene materials according to
local, as opposed to national, "contemporary community standards."1 43 This
interpretation enabled the FBI to pursue obscenity charges in conservative jurisdictions like Kentucky, North Carolina, and Utah, and shut down national
distributors of sex toys by focusing its energy on the most prudish links in the
distribution chain.1 44 Even if some of these obscenity prosecutions were unsuccessful, they nonetheless had the effect of substantially raising the costs of doing business in markets for sexual materials.1 4 5 These concerted federal efforts
to shut down interstate commerce in sexual materials continued into the 1990s,
when courts finally started to push back on First Amendment grounds. Several
140 See Black Jack Distribs., Inc. v. Beame, 433 F. Supp. 1297, 1305-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("Defendants herein are admittedly trying to drive plaintiffs out of business, and plaintiffs' employees have
been detained injail overnight without apparent reason."); see also Krahmv. Graham, 461 F.2d 703,
705, 709 (9th Cir. 1972) (granting an injunction against pending and future prosecutions where adult
bookstore owners and employees had been the subject of more than one hundred prosecutions within a
two-year period); Mia. Health Studios, Inc. v. City of Mia. Beach, 353 F. Supp. 593, 595 (S.D. Fla.
1973) (observing that plaintiff's premises had been subjected to ten "raids" in a four-and-a-half month
period and that police officers announced that they would continue until the employees quit and the
business closed), vacated, 491 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1974).
141 See, e.g., PHE, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 743 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Beginning after the search of plaintiffs' premises and continuing through 1986, the defendants made clear that
PHE, Harvey, and other individuals associated with PHE would be prosecuted in multiple jurisdictions across the United States unless plaintiffs agreed to substantially curtail what they contend are
their constitutionally protected expressive activities nationwide, and to go out of business entirely in
Utah."); United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987) (determining whether a
chain of retail video stores selling purportedly "obscene" movies and media constituted an "enterprise" for the purposes of federal RICO statutes); see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 165.
142 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (articulating three guidelines for determining when state laws are
permissible regulations of obscene materials: "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
143 See Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the FirstAmendment:A Callfor aNew ObscenityStandard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 109 & n.126 (1996) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 32).
144 See United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1992) (outlining the FBI's "coordinated, nationwide prosecution strategy against companies that sold obscene materials"); PHE,
Inc., 743 F. Supp. at 18 (discussing the multijurisdictional strike from federal agents against associates
of PHE); see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 164; Clay Calvert, The End ofForum Shopping in
InternetObscenity Cases? The Ramifications ofthe Ninth Circuit'sGroundbreakingUnderstandingof
Community Standardsin Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 56 (2010).
145 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 248-50, 263-65.
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courts bristled at federal efforts to interrupt the sale not just of sexual materials
that were legally obscene, but also sexual materials that were protected by the
First Amendment.1 46
Although the federal war on sex toys appears to have largely subsided,
several states nonetheless have launched their own initiatives to criminalize the
sale and distribution of sex toys. During 1970s, '80s, and '90s, eight states and
several municipalities amended their obscenity laws to, for the first time, expressly set forth the illegality of sex toys. Thus, even ifthe federal government
granted market exclusivity to sexual devices, it would be unlawful for the patentee to exploit this market in numerous states. For example, Texas, Kansas,
and Colorado have defined an "obscene device" as "a device including a dildo
or artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs."1 47 Many ofthese laws have been challenged as
unconstitutional, and courts' divergent treatment of these laws bears closer attention in light of our study.
Sexual device statutes in Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas have all been
upheld by state courts as valid enforcements of public morality.1 48 In 1999, in
Williams v. Pryor, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District ofAlabama,
in upholding Alabama's sexual device statute, accepted as a legitimate government objective, "[b]anning 'the commerce of sexual stimulation and autoeroticism, for its own sake, unrelated to marriage, procreation[,] or familial
relationships."1 49 Moreover, in 2007, in Williams v. Morgan, a subsequent appeal in the case's lengthy procedural history, the U.S. Court ofAppeals forthe
Eleventh Circuit upheld the statute notwithstanding testimony presented to the
district court that some customers "use these [prohibited] products to avoid the
possibility of sexually transmitted diseases"; some "use the products to better
stimulate intimate relationships with partner"; some "to achieve sexual satisfaction not otherwise available to them"; some "for temporary or long-term
14 6

See PHE, Inc., 743 F. Supp. at 25 ("Plaintiffs' factual showing[s] . . demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that defendants' conduct constitutes bad faith calculated to suppress plaintiffs' constitutional rights.").
147 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(3) (2022); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301(c)(1)(C)(3) (repealed
2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (West 2021), held unconstitutionalby Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
14 8
Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260,266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (enbanc) ("[T]he rationale justifying the State's exercise of the police power against obscene expression that is, the protection of
the social interest in order and morality also justifies the State in criminalizing the promotion of
objects designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs."); Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ga. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (rejecting the
argument that sex-related devices constitute "protected expressions under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments"); PHE, Inc. v. State, 2003-CA-00456-SCT (¶ 19) (Miss. 2004), 877 So. 2d 1244, 1250
(deducing that because the state statute prohibits selling sex devices, the advertisement of those devices cannot be "protected speech" under the Constitution).
149 Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1287 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
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sexual satisfaction when a partner is not otherwise available"; and some are
"referred to the store by therapists treating them for sexual dysfunction or marital problems." 5 0 In other words, the Eleventh Circuit rejected arguments
about the social utility of sex toys that were nearly identical to those found satisfactory by the Patent Office.
Moreover, even though the Supreme Court had recognized a constitutional right to use contraceptives in the context of nonprocreative, nonmarital
sex' 5' and had protected the intimate decision to have nonprocreative sex with
people of all genders, 52 these courts refused to hold that a ban on selling sex
toys triggered any constitutionally protected interest in sexual pleasure. 153 Several scholars have lamented that questions of sexual pleasure have been almost
entirely missing from U.S. law, notwithstanding legal decisions ostensibly recognizing and protecting sexual freedoms. 54 In the absence of any constitutionally-protected interest in sexual pleasure for its own sake, law enforcement has
undertaken numerous undercover sting operations pursuant to sexual device

150 478 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007); Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-63 (quoting
Stipulation of Facts, Doc. No. 33 (Dec. 3, 1998)).
151 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 439 (1972) (clarifying that "whatever the rights of the individual to access . . . contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the
married alike").
152 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that the petitioners had the constitutional right as "free . . adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty").
153 Williams, 478 F.3d at 1323 ("[W]e find that public morality survives as a rational basis for
legislation even afterLawrence,and we find that in this case the State's interest in the preservation of
public morality remains a rational basis forthe challenged statute."); Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 265 ("Appellant does not claimthat obscene devices serve, like contraceptives, to implement the constitutionally protected decision not to beget a child."); see Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One 's Own: Morality
andSexual PrivacyAfter Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 10 (2004) (highlighting the
incredible influence appellate courts hold over trial courts through their presentation of the pertinent
constitutional inquiries that the lower court should consider on remand).
154 Libby Adler, The Future ofSodomy, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 199-200 (2005); Katherine
M. Franke, Commentary, The DomesticatedLibertyofLawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399,
1399 (2004); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?, SOC. TEXT, Fall-Winter 2005, at 235, 241. Professors Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer
Rothman explain, "[C]ourts have extended legal protection to consensual sexual acts only to the extent such acts support other state interests, including marriage, procreation, and . .. the development
of enduring intimate relationships." Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 809 (2010). Most notably, althoughthe Supreme CourtinLawrence v.
Texas overturned laws banning adult consensual sodomy, in the majority opinion, sex was constitutionally protected not because of its connection to pleasure but rather because of its connection to
emotional intimacy and committed relationships. According to Justice Kennedy, "To say that the issue
. . was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right
to have sexual intercourse." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (discussing the Court's previous ruling in
Bowers v. Hardwick, see 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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statutes in order to shut down brick-and-mortar businesses and arrest organizers of in-home, Tupperware-style passion parties. 55
By contrast, other state supreme courts, such as in Colorado, Kansas, and
Louisiana, have struck down sexual device statutes on constitutional grounds. 156
All but one of these courts, 57 however, have done so not in recognition of a
legal right to engage in nonprocreative sex or to affirmatively seek sexual
pleasure. Instead, these courts have held that some statutes unconstitutionally
invaded the right to use dildos, vibrators, and other sex toys as partof medical
treatment or maritaltherapy.158 In 1990, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v
Hughes extensively recounted the expert testimony of a "state-certified psychologist and sex therapist" whose work focused on "the problem of women
who do not reach orgasm during sexual intercourse"; this condition rendered
women "particularly susceptible to pelvic inflammatory diseases, psychologi-

155 Webberv. State, 21 S.W.3d 726, 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) ("Deputy Sheriff L. Carlin, working an undercover operation, entered the Adult Video Store, a licensed sexually oriented business....
Carlin told appellant that she was experiencing marital problems and that she was looking for a vibrator something for sexual gratification."); Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ga. 1977) (upholding
conviction of an adult bookstore operator, who sold an artificial vagina and an obscene magazine to an
undercover officer); Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (involving the
prosecution of the principle shareholder and investor of two sex device retailers); see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 6; Herald, supra note 153, at 27.
156 People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 370 (Colo. 1985) (en
banc) (deeming the state's interest insufficient to prop up a statute that essentially "equate[s] sex with
obscenity"); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1990) (noting the legitimate reasons individuals would seek to use sex devices, such as medical treatment, and thus finding the state's law "overbroad and unconstitutional"); State v. Brenan, 99-2291, p. 16 (La. 5/16/00); 772 So. 2d 64, 76 (determining that no "legitimate state interest" existed to rationalize plenary ban of sex devices).
157 InReliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,the U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Fifth Circuit declared
unconstitutional Texas's sexual device statute based upon the Supreme Court's decision inLawrence
v. Texas, which appeared to adopt the view that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice." 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruledby Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). According to
the Fifth Circuit, "To uphold the statute would be to ignore the holding in Lawrence and allow the
government to burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally offensive."
Id. Texas state courts, however, have declined to follow the Fifth Circuit and have adhered to older
case law upholding the sexual device statute. See Villarreal v. State, 267 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2008).
151 See Seven Thirty-Five . Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d at 370 ("The statutory scheme, in its present
form, impermissibly burdens the right of privacy of those seeking to make legitimate medical or therapeutic use of such devices."); Kaplan, supra note 27, at 158 ("Constitutional challenges were successful only to the extent that they ensured statutory exceptions for medical use."); Craig Konnoth,
Medicalizationandthe New CivilRights, 72 STAN. L. REv. 1165, 1198 (2020) ("Medical challenges
to bans on the sale of sexual devices, such as vibrators, have been more successful than those made
purely on sexual autonomy grounds."); Reid, supra note 119, at 84 ("Inorderto recast the behavior as
therapeutic, the individual interest at stake must be 'elevated' from an interest in pleasure to an interest in medical treatment.").
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cal problems, and difficulty in marital relationships."' 5 9 The psychologist testified that "anorgasmic women" often benefit from treatment with a "dildo-type
vibrator" for similar reasons as "people with cerebral palsy."1 60 The testimony
continued, stating that a dildo-type vibrator was useful "for women suffering
urinary stress incontinence" following childbirth.161 The Kansas and Louisiana
Supreme Courts also pointed out that the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) had issued guidelines about the use of "'powered vaginal muscle stimulators' and 'genital vibrators' for the treatment of sexual dysfunction," indicating that there was a bona fide medical need for legal sex toys.162 Accordingly,
the sexual device statutes invaded "a sphere of constitutionally protected privacy which encompasses the intimate medical problems associated with sexual
activity."163
These same strategies-sex toys as instrumental to healthy relationships
or as treatments for frigidity and dysfunction-are certainly present in many of
the pleasure patents that this Article examines. Nonetheless, there are numerous patentees who openly claim to facilitate sexual pleasure for its own sakean interest deemed insufficient by all courts to have addressed the legality of
sex toy bans. This narrow medical framing of rights to access sexual technologies is highly significant, although perhaps too clever by half'1 64 There may not
be a constitutional right to use a vibrator to enhance your own sexual pleasure,
but there is a constitutional right to use a vibrator to treat your difficulty obtaining sexual pleasure.1 65 In other words, states cannot criminalize sex toys, so
long as the baseline for using a sex toy is sexual dysfunction as opposed to a
healthy sexual appetite.1 66 If your pleasure cup is half empty, the Constitution
protects your ability to fill it up; if your cup is half full, however, the Constitution has nothing to say on the matter.167
159 Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1025; see also Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 75-76 (reviewing medical literature
on the use of vibrators).
160 Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1025.
161 Id
162 Id. at 1031 (quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940, 884.5960 (2022)); Brenan,
772 So. 2d at 75

(quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940, 884.5960).
163 Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1029 (quoting Seven Thirty-Five E Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d
at 369 n.26 (citation omitted)).
164 See Appleton, supra note 27, at 329 ("A problem with even some of the judicial
opinions
overturning restrictions on sex toys is that they emphasize the medical needs of otherwise anorgasmic
women.").
165 That said, the FDA has the authority to regulate medical devices pre-market. See Abigail All.
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
166
See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: RegulatingWomen's Sexuality, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1235, 1250 (2007) (criticizing the reliance on medical justifications forfemale sextoys and advocating for women's free use of these devices to attain sexual pleasure equally as men do)).
167 According to Professor Marybeth Herald, "[F]orty-three percent of women experience sexual
problems," which is consistent with historical rates of "frigidity" in women. Herald, supranote 153, at
25. She suggests that "[i]t is a wonder that the high percentage alone does not alert us to the fact that it
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In order to sidestep the constitutionality of criminalizing women's pursuit
of sexual pleasure, courts in the sexual device cases tried to point to less controversial medical interests.1 68 Nonetheless, some of the products directly at
issue in these cases were expressly marketed as "not Intended as a Medical
Device," and included, for example, an inflatable doll that the Kansas Supreme
Court took pains to bracket in its discussion.1 69 Notwithstanding one court's
declaration that seized items were "shameful, reprehensible and disgusting, "170
there is no way to convincingly separate legalized sex toys from the pursuit of
sexual pleasure. In the view of some scholars, sexually dysfunctional sex toy
purchasers are both more sympathetic and less threatening than women seeking pleasure for its own sake.171 In other words, the Sharper Image strategy
may work fine in the Patent Office, but generalist courts have been comparatively skeptical.
To this day, sex toys hover at the legal margins. Although, as of this writing, it appears that only Alabama actively enforces its ban on selling sexual
devices,1 72 equivalent laws in other jurisdictions remain on the books, as do the
federal Comstock laws. Most recently, the 2020 CARES Act,1 73 which allocated $659 billion in low-interest small business loans, excludes businesses that
profit from the sale of sexual devices. 7 4 The regulations promulgated by the
Small Business Administration (SBA) state that businesses are ineligible for
SBA loans if they "[d]erive directly or indirectly more than de minimis gross
revenue through the sale of products or services, or the presentation of any depictions or displays, of a prurient sexual nature."175
In sum, from the mid-1800s until the present day, sex toys, when expressly branded as sex toys, have enjoyed little acceptance from the legal system

&

may not necessarily be the woman who is sexually dysfunctional. A more logical conclusion to be
drawn . . might be that it is the culture .... " Id.
168 Id. at 25 (explaining that women, as opposed to men, are more likely to face difficulties
achieving orgasm through easily-attained physical positions, and therefore are more likely to benefit
from the aid of a sexual device).
169 See Reid, supra note 119, at 87 (quoting State v. Brenan, 99-2291, p. 2 (La. 5/16/00); 772
So. 2d 64, 77 (Traylor, J., dissenting)).
171 State v. Brenan, 98-2368, p. 1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/1/99); 739 So. 2d 368, 373 (Carter, C.J.
Whipple, J., specially concurring), aff'd, 1999-2291 (La. 5/16/00); 772 So. 2d 64.
171 Herald, supra note 153, at 23-24 (perceiving that litigation strategy centered on a "maleoriented lens" tends to be a popular, and more successful, route for challenging state obscenity laws).
172 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 289.
173 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9080).
174
See generally Brian Soucek, Discriminatory Paycheck Protection, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE
319, 333 (2020), https://29qishllqx5q2k5d7b491joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2020/07/SoucekDiscriminatory-Paycheck-Protection_11CalifLRev319.pdf [https://perma.cc/U82L5ZHD] (detailing the exclusion of businesses related to "dangerous ideas" (quoting Regan v. Tax'n
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983))).
175 13 C.F.R. § 120.110(p)(2) (2022).
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and have been outright banned in many jurisdictions. Only when marketed as a
plain-old household appliance or as a medical intervention have they managed
to receive the blessing-or at least tacit acceptance-of U.S. law. The Patent
Office, by contrast, has found persuasive a much broader range of narratives
concerning sexual pleasure regarding the utility of sex toys.
III. UTILITY, PLEASURE, AND THE

USPTO

Compared with the wide range of criminal prohibitions surveyed in the
previous Part,1 76 the patent system is not, for the most part, designed to judge
either the market or moral value of an invention. The result is a substantial
body of patents that have not only been issued, but have been treated as largely
unexceptional by the USPTO, district courts and the Federal Circuit. 77 One
explanation for this is that inventors will not try to patent worthless inventions,
for which there is no commercial demand or which are legally prohibited from
sale, because the resulting patents would themselves be worthless.1 78 And if
inventors choose to patent worthless inventions, there is no great harm in it.
Still, there is a patent requirement that addresses the worth and moral value of
inventions: the utility requirement-the requirement that a patent be "useful."
The patent statute defines patentable inventions as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."1 79 The result of the requirement that an invention be
"useful" is that issued patents generally include a section explaining the object
of the invention, followed by a section explaining how the invention accomplishes that object, allowing researchers to see how notions of utility change
over time.

176

See supra Part 11.

177 A recent decisionby the Patent Trial and Appeal Board upholding the validity of a sex toy patent over prior art references, for example, dispassionately explained that, "for purposes of this decision, Petitioner has also established through the testimony of Dr. Prisco that Guan teaches all of the
other elements of claim 1 with the exception of the presence of an appendage configured as a dildo
configured to be inserted into a vagina." EIS GmbH v. Novoluto GmbH, No. IPR2019-01302, 2020
WL 3273010, at *2 (P.T.A.B. June 17, 2020); see also Ritchie v. Vast Res., Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (indulging in some word play but ultimately addressing the issue of the obviousness
of the use of a certain type of glass for a dildo). "By 'lubricious'-a word whose primary meaning,
appropriate for a sexual device, is 'lecherous' the patent means only 'slippery,' which is the secondary meaning of the word.... [W]hat is meant is that the glass, because it contains oxide of boron, is
smoother than soda-lime glass and therefore becomes slippery with less lubricant than a device made
out of soda-lime glass." Ritchie, 563 F.3d at 1336.
178 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) ("If itbe not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard.").
179 35 U. S.C. § 101. The concept of utility is revisited in the disclosure requirements of the Patent
Act, which states that a patent application must describe "the manner and process of making and using" an invention. Id. § 112(a). By requiring a description of the manner of use of an invention, this
section presumes that it is amenable to use, or, useful.
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While this is the crux of the utility requirement-that the invention have a
purpose and that the patent document explain how it achieves that purposecourts have struggled to determine what it really means to be useful. That is
because what is "useful" can be an incredibly complicated question about what
pursuits are worthwhile and whether and how various inventions aid in those
pursuits. Utility, it turns out, is inseparable from social norms about the worth
and moral value of any given activity.
At first blush, the patent system's requirement of usefulness and the sex
toy's designated purpose of sexual pleasure might seem at odds with one another. A closer look, however, reveals that the patent system has long recognized the utility of pleasure.1 80 For example, the USPTO issued a patent to
James L. Haven and Charles Hettrick in 1866 for a "new and useful bandelore,"
now better known as a yo-yo.18' This was the same year Milton Bradley received
a patent on a board game called the "checkered game of life," which, although a
game, is described as imparting on youthful minds "the great moral principles of
virtue and vice."182 As a dive into the scholarship and history ofthe utility doctrine shows, notions of virtue and vice play a role in utility analysis, with some
inventions being held unpatentable or unenforceable because they facilitated
gambling or other types of deceit.
Nor has the utility requirement been a strong bar to patentability in general over the years. Noting this, Michael Risch has suggested that usefulness
has become a "toothless and misunderstood .. . doctrine, which requires that
patents only have a bare minimum potential for use."1 83 There are three doctrinal strands to utility. The first-credible or operable utility-remains a constant but relatively unlitigated bar, requiring merely that the invention actually
function as described.1 84 Second, courts have interpreted the Patent Act to require that inventions have beneficial utility-that is, a requirement that inventions not have a socially deleterious purpose.18 5 This moral utility requirement,
"' See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Patent Office

[does not] worry about the utility of games, toys, and cosmetics.").
81 U.S. Patent No. 59,745 (issued Nov. 20, 1866).
18 U.S. Patent No. 53,561 (issued Apr. 3, 1866).
8 Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1197; see also Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-BasedOpen Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007);
Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 62 (2011).
184 See SARAH BURSTEIN, SARAH R. WASSERMANRAJEC & ANDRES

SAWICKI, PATENTLAW: AN

OPEN-ACCESS CASEBOOK 160 (2021) ("Credible utility, also called operable utility, requires that a
patent be able to do what it says it does. In simple terms, the doctrine bars patentability for impossible
inventions, such as perpetual motion machines or time travel inventions."). In the case of applications
for inventions that are not credible, the USPTO has authority to require a working model of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 114.
185 See infra notes 189-199 (discussing judicial interpretation of the Patent Act); see also Act of
Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (originating the American patent), repealedby Act of
Feb. 21, 1973, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836) (amending the 1790 Patent Act and interpreted by the court in Lowell v. Lewis, see 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)).
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the most relevant to our inquiry, has greatly diminished in stringency, as discussed below.18 6 Third is the requirement that the invention have practical utility-that is, that the identified utility be specific and substantial.1 87 This requirement, driving more recent judicial and scholarly attention to the doctrine,
entails that the applicant demonstrate "that that claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public."1 88
It is the second of these categories, beneficial utility, that requires patent
examiners and judges to situate inventions in their social, legal, and moral context. Beneficial utility shapes the universe of patentable inventions through a
lens of morality. In the canonical 1817 case, Lowell v Lewis, Justice Joseph
Story, sitting in a district court by designation, charged the jury that the utility
bar to patentability only requires "that the invention should not be frivolous or
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society."1 89 In elevating morality as a potential bar to patentability, Justice Story relied on the
commercial viability of inventions as an adequate bar to most useless inventions. The issue in that case was not one of morality of the invention (a water
pump). Instead, the defendant and accused infringer argued that the patented
pump was not better than any other on the market. Justice Story instructed the
jury that it was not necessary that the patented invention be demonstrably superior to that which was already known.1 90 Instead, Justice Story explained that
if the invention was not sufficiently useful, "it will silently sink into contempt

After enacting and repealing a litany various patent laws since the country's founding, Congress, in
1952, enacted the Patent Act that set the foundation for modern American patent law. See Act of July
19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293); see also
supra note 179 (laying out federal patent law as it exists today).
186 See infra notes 193-201.
187 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("Until the process claim has been reduced to
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of
precise delineation.").
188 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Modern scholarship on the utility doctrine
focuses on its application in the fields of chemistry and biochemistry. Sean Seymore points out that
judicial application of the doctrine results in a technology-specific patentability requirement, allowing
patents on inventions in most fields but providing a more serious bar to patentability in chemical
fields as well as other unpredictable fields or new technologies that are not yet well understood. Seymore, supra note 15, at 629. This is because of the requirement that an inventor state the purpose of
her invention. In unpredictable fields, inventors may discover a new molecule or develop a new organism that has promising qualities, but the specific use of which is not yet known. In a sense, the
utility requirement, as applied in these novel and unpredictable technologies, is atiming requirement:
an inventor must have done enough research to state a use for her invention before applying for a
patent.
189 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
190
Id. Justice Story noted the defendant's assertion "that it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove"
that his claimed pump "supersede the pumps in common use" and then wrote, "I do not so understand
the law." Id
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and disregard."191 Lowell is often cited for its language on beneficial utility and
the easily met requirement that an invention not be harmful to morality.
In discussing morality, the Lowell court posited that an invention that poisoned people or one aimed at promoting debauchery would not be patentable.
Soon, cases arose that challenged the boundaries of beneficial utility. In these,
lower courts addressed-and found unpatentable-inventions on gambling
devices and inventions that were considered deceptive. Although gambling
devices were held unpatentable in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century, such patents were eventually allowed in the 1970s.1 92 It was not until
1999 that the Federal Circuit held that deceptive devices were not necessarily
immoral and were therefore patentable.
In 1999, in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. OrangeBang, Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld the patent on a beverage dispenser with a simulated display of a mixed
beverage.1 93 The beverage dispenser was equipped with tubes that ran beneath
a countertop and dispensed both syrup concentrate and water that mixed together into juice. The deceptive portion of the invention was above the dispenser: a plastic reservoir that held and recirculated liquid, so that customers
approaching the machine would believe their drinks to already have been
mixed.1 94 In coming to its holding, the court declined to follow a number of
cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that had held deception to be an immoral use for patents.1 95 In 1900, in Rickardv. Du Bon, the
Second Circuit held that a chemical process used to make tobacco plants appear spotted-and therefore of a higher quality-was misleading without any
added utility, and therefore unpatentable.1 96 Similarly, in 1925, in Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., the Second Circuit held unpatentable a structure for the back of seamless stockings that imitated a seamed stocking.1 97 The
court ruled that the stockings' artful construction was not patentable because it

191

Id.

See, e.g., Brewerv. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1922) (holding gambling machine
unpatentable); Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 802 (B.P.A.I. 1977) (finding gambling
devices no longer unpatentable).
193 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
194
d. at 1365-66 (describing the "visual impression" that the machine's bowl gave to a consumers in195an attempt to raise product sales).
d. at 1367 (first citing Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900); then citing Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925)).
196 Rickard, 103 F. at 868 ("[A]n improvement in the art of treating tobacco leaves . .
is void,
because not useful; the only effect . .. if not the only object, being to spot the tobacco, and counterfeit
the leaf spotted by natural causes.").
197
Aristo Hosiery, 7 F.2d at 1004.
192
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focused on the marketability, as opposed to the functional improvement, of the
product.' 98
In declining to follow these cases, the Federal Circuit noted how deception
can be valuable-that it can be useful to design an object to appear as another.
The court gave as examples gold leaf, synthetic fabrics, imitation leather, and
cubic zirconium.1 99 Some of these deceptive techniques were aimed at casual
observers, rather than purchasers ofthe invention. For others, such as imitation
leather, the deception avoided using the "real" material while still attaining the
desired look. 200 The court noted that the deception contemplated in the claimed
invention was not unlawful, and then pointed to the agencies charged with
monitoring and minimizing fraudulent sales practices. While such agencies
may not have existed in the time of Lowell, the Federal Trade Commission and
the FDA now both exist and contain the expertise to determine when deceptive
practices have occurred and what the appropriate remedies are. 201
Utility is a concept tightly interwoven with the society in which it is being
measured. This is true both in a general sense about the shared values of a
community and in a temporal sense, as objects gain or lose utility over time
based on social and cultural evolution. For example, it would have been impossible to describe the utility of a software patent in 1876, when such inventions held no meaning. Similarly, patents that were once denied as immoral,
such as those on nylons that merely appear to have seams up the back, seem
neither immoral nor particularly useful decades later because today seamed
stockings are no longer considered more valuable than un-seamed stockingsor no stockings at all.
Accordingly, as social values change overtime, so do perceptions ofutility. For example, Professor Kara Swanson demonstrates such evolving perceptions through a historical analysis of the1876 Supreme Court case, Cohn v.
US. Corset Co., about corset patents. 202 Her analysis unveils the accepted social utility of these feminine undergarments, at the time, because of the result-

198

1 d ("At best, the seamless stocking has imitation marks for the purpose of deception, and the

idea prevails that with such imitation the article is more salable. But such accomplishment does not
create a new useful discovery or invention .... ").
199 Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367.
2 00
Id. at 1367-68.
2 01
Id. at 1368 (citingln re Watson, 517 F.2d 465,474-76 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (pointing to the essential, supplemental function executive agencies provide to consumers and the Patent Office by conducting safety checks on otherwise patentable products, like pharmaceuticals).
202 93 U.S. 366, 376 (1876) (criticizing that the newly proposed process for corset-making "would
not adapt to the corset to fit the wearer, and would not be consistent with elegance of shape"); Swanson, supra note 17, at 84-89 (remarking that the male Supreme Court Justices in Cohn did not employ
any expert testimony when evaluating the corset patent, as was typical for other more technological
patents).
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ing feminine shape that men found pleasing. 203 "Corsets," she explains, "may
have been feminine technology, made for use by women, but their purpose204was
to satisfy the male gaze, 'functioning and signifying for the beholder."'
Patents related to cannabis similarly demonstrate how changing social
mores and laws affect patentability under the beneficial utility doctrine. Marijuana remains a Schedule I substance under federal law 205 and is therefore unlawful "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess." 206 Yet, as the purported medical benefits of marijuana have become more widely-accepted (and
its immorality as a recreational drug questioned), its use has become sanctioned by numerous states for medical and recreational purposes. 207As society
has warmed to the use of marijuana, inventors are applying for patents on
methods of extraction, use, and strains of cannabis, even as their patentability
remains questionable under the beneficial utility doctrine. 208 And the USPTO
now issues such patents in ever-increasing numbers. 209 Courts have yet to affirmatively weigh in on this issue, although there is a patent infringement lawsuit currently pending in the Colorado federal district court centered on a cannabis-related patent.2 10
Perhaps the most surprising observation about our study is that the accounts used by patentees to explain the value of their inventions do not closely
track changes either in patent doctrine or in the legal treatment of sexual technologies more broadly. Most notably, the Federal Circuit's express renunciation of the moral utility doctrine in 1999 does not emerge as a significant in-

Swanson, supra note 17, at 74. Kara Swanson discusses the utility of the corset, which could
"tilt the spine into the desired shape, from poker-straightness to the S-curve emphasized in the turn of
the twentieth-century Gibson girl ideal," thus achieving "this ideal feminine form, although most
inventions were directed to improvements in the making, wearing or washing of the corset." Id.
204 Swanson, supra note 17, at 88 (quoting Leslie Shannon Miller, The Many Figures of Eve:
203

Styles of Womanhood Embodied in a Late-Nineteenth-CenturyCorset, in AMERICAN ARTIFACTS:

ESSAYS IN MATERIAL CULTURE 129, 136 (Jules David Prown & Kenneth Haltman eds., 2000)).
205 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c).
206 See id. § 841.
207 Audrey McNamara, These States Now Have Legal Weed, and Which States Could Follow Suit
in 2020, CBS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-is-marijuana-legal-in2020-illinois-joins-10-other-states-legalizing-recreational-pot-2020-01-01/ [https://perma.cc/D3RGA3XA].
208 See Ryan Davis, MarijuanaPatentApplicationsFace Tough Road at USPTO, LAW360 (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/609140/marijuana-patent-applications-face-tough-road-atuspto [https://perma.cc/S2LR-Z839] (showing that even recently, many patent attorneys doubted the
patentability of marijuana-based claims).
209 See Matthew Kamps, The Number of Cannabis-CentricPatents Is Getting High, LAW360

(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1206064 [https://penna.cc/ALK8-6YMP].
210 United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective, Inc., No. 18-cv-01922, 2020 WL 376508, at
*1 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2020) (weighing contrary interpretations of the term "cannabinoids").
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flection point in either the framing or frequency of pleasure patents. 21 1 By that
year, the USPTO had already gradually increased its issuance of the pleasure
patents in our study, and that increase continued gradually after the Federal
Circuit's decision in Juicy Whip.212 Moreover, patentees had openly and explicitly discussed a diverse range of sexual practices even during the time periods
where the moral utility doctrine was still alive in the U.S. patent system. Furthermore, such explicitly sexual themes were deployed at the same time that
sexual devices were unlawful in several states and only avoided legal prohibition when dressed up as medical treatments or as general-purpose massage
devices. Patentees presented frank sexual narratives to the USPTO during
times when a variety of legal doctrines would suggest that doing so would be a
terrible idea-and were nevertheless rewarded with patents.
IV. MAKING SEXY PATENTS (AND MAKING PATENTS SEXY)

The main purpose of this Article is to bring attention to the strange phenomenon of pleasure patents, especially in light of patent law's historical exclusion of immoral inventions as well as the broader legal hostility towards the
sale and manufacture of sex toys. Our study, however, does open up several
potential avenues of research for scholars both inside and outside the field of
intellectual property. This Part provides a series of invitations to legal scholars,
particularly those interested in interdisciplinary studies of technology, sexuality, and social norms.
Although there may be a tension, or at least a disconnect, between patent
narratives and patent doctrine within the pleasure patent dataset, there does
appear to be a close connection between patent narratives and the shifting,
background sexual zeitgeist. As concerns around marriage, gender norms,
queer sexuality, and sexual health shifted from the 1960s through the present
day, so too did the accounts accompanying issued patents. The fact that the
patent registry contains such a rich archive of sexual norms suggests that the
field of patent law is ripe for greater inquiry through a law and society lens. As
Professor Kara Swanson has observed, "[I]ntellectual property law has been
resistant to law and society scholarship, and the patent system, perhaps most of
all. It is simply assumed to exist in a world apart. . . " 2 13 Pleasure patents illustrate that the patent system exists very much within the world around it. In
fact, this Article's analysis of pleasure patents suggests that patents may map
more closely onto shifting sexual norms than the legal system writ large. At the
211 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (acknowledging Justice Story's canonical opinion in Lowell, but qualifying that morality had not "been applied
broadly in recent years" as a barometer for patentability).
212 For example, the USPTO issued nine patents classified as A6 1H19/00 in 1995, six in 1996, ten
in 1997, nine in 1998, eight in 1999, thirteen in 2000, eleven in 2001, and twelve in 2002.
213 Swanson, supra note 25, at 20 (footnote
omitted).
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very least, this analysis demonstrates that patent scholarship would benefit
from at least three different types of interdisciplinary work in the law and society tradition.
The first approach is historical. Patents--and the technologies they disclose--are products of their historical contexts, and they reflect and perpetuate
both the values and concerns of their time.2 14 As scholars such as Professors
Kara Swanson, Brian Frye, and Brenda Reddix-Smalls have shown, the U.S.
patent system has been infused with race, gender, and class hierarchy since its
inception.m As such, historical patent work can be a crucial component ofunderstanding inequalities in the patent system that persist to this day.2 16 Our
study indicates that sexuality provides another historical lens through which
scholars could fruitfully approach the patent system.
The second approach is sociological. Patented technologies result from
the convergence of different groups of people (e.g., engineers, managers, drafting attorneys, patent agents, judges, juries, and consumers) and it can be incredibly useful to understand who these people are demographically and how
they are organized within their various institutions.217 If patent law is meant to
incentivize innovation, the effectiveness of such incentives will likely hinge
upon how patentees are recognized, rewarded, and compensated. 2 18 If certain
demographics of patent applicants are statistically less likely to succeed in the
Patent Office, sociological approaches may help illuminate the institutional
and social barriers-both inside and outside the Office-that regularly imped-

214

See CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE

PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA 4 (2015) ("[P]atent law so often dismissed as an arcane and
impenetrable niche of legal practice has played an active and controversial role in the course of
American history.").
215
See Kara W. Swanson, Essay, Race andSelective LegalMemory: Reflections on Invention of
a Slave, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (2020) (examining the intersection between "the history of
the patent system" and "the history of black inventors"); Frye, supra note 25, at 182 (detailing the
history of slave owners who attempted to patent the technologies invented by their slaves); Brenda
Reddix-Smalls, IntellectualProperty, Income Inequality, andSocietalInterconnectivityin the United
States: Social Calculus and the HistoricalDistributionof Wealth, 11 N.C. CENT. U. SCI. & INTELL.

&

PROP. L. REV. 1, 39 (2018) ("[I]t appears that, as with slavery, the drafters of the Constitution were
acting forthe benefits of the vested money classes in providing a proprietary interest to innovators and
creators.... [C]opyright and patent regimes, as a subset of intellectual property, operated as part of a
complex adaptive legal ecosystem in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.").
216 See generallyHolly Fechner & Matthew S. Shapanka, ClosingDiversity Gaps in Innovation:
Gender, Race, andIncome Disparitiesin PatentingandCommercializationoflnventions, 19 TECH.
INNOVATION 727 (2018).
217 See Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology ofPatenting,101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 452 (2016) (address-

ing the "ecology of business" that defines the patent industry).
218
See id. at 441 (suggesting that the rhetoric surrounding intellectual property law encourages an
elusive folklore of "the solitary genius who is motivated and rewarded for his efforts" to shift focus
away from the less glamorous corporate interests at play).
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ing such success. 219 In the context of pleasure patents, our study raises questions about the organization of both the sex toy industry and the Patent Office.
Particularly given the historical legal precarity of making and selling sex toys
at scale,220 what benefits flowed to patentees in this industry that might justify
the considerable cost of patenting? On the Patent Office side, is there something about the culture, structure, or demographics of the patent examiners that
has facilitated their embrace of sexual technologies relative to other government actors?22 ' Unfortunately, historical information about the interactions
between applicants and examiners can be difficult to obtain, largely due to the
secrecy of patent applications before 2000-a frustration other scholars share,
particularly for any applications that did not result in issued patents.222 The
219 See id. at 451-52 (urging further inquiry into the institutional structures that prop up the patent
process). See generally Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Anti-innovation
Norms, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1069 (2018) (exploring the "nonlegal factors" and "social norms" encircling and necessarily impacting the intellectual property and patent space).
221 See supra Part
II.
221 One interesting contrast to the patent law story is that other areas of intellectual
property have
been slower to treat pleasure products with neutrality. The USPTO does more than examine and issue
patents; it is, after all, the patent and trademark office. And morality has played a prominent role in
recent trademark law decisions. Just as the trends in utility descriptions for pleasure patents have not
closely paralleled the changes in doctrine in that area, the patent and trademark positions on morality
have not evolved in parallel. In 2019, inlancu v. Brunetti, the Supreme Court found that the Lanham
Act's prohibition of registration of trademarks that are immoral or scandalous violated the First
Amendment. 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019). In so doing, the Court recognized how strongly questions
of morality are tied into social norms and, importantly for the First Amendment analysis, into viewpoints. Thus, the law allowed "registration of marks that champion society's sense of rectitude and
morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts." Id. at 2299. This is a far cry from the Federal
Circuit's fairly uncontroversial Juicy Whip, Inc. v. OrangeBang, Inc. decision decades prior and the
century of pleasure patents issued before the USPTO could finally accept trademarks for marks that
were immoral. Even now, Robert Mikos points out that the USPTO has a "lawful use requirement"
that results in the refusal or cancellation of marks for goods and services that violate drug laws or
consumer protections laws, interalia. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Unauthorizedand Unwise: The
Lawful Use Requirement in TrademarkLaw, 75 VAND. L. REV. 161 (2022). What accounts for this
difference between treatment of patents and trademarks, despite being granted and regulated by the
same agency? One possible explanation is that trademarks governproducts that are used in commerce,
whereas patents grant an exclusive right with no promise of allowing use. Thus, the trademark may be
seen as carrying a stronger imprimatur of government approval for use than a patent.
222 See Swanson, supra note 25, at 13 n.67 (explaining the difficulty of identifying whether and
how many patents for abortifacient technologies were sought prior to 1968); see also Christopher A.
Cotropia & David L. Schwartz, The Hidden Value ofAbandonedApplications to the Patent System,
61 B.C. L. REV. 2809, 2828-30 (2020) (explaining that in the twenty-five years before passage of the
American Inventors Protection Act in 1999, abandoned applications were not published or considered
prior art for later-filed patent applications). However, in a review of the file histories of the six earliest
pleasure patents in the study, only one reveals any discussion related to the pleasure-seeking purposes
of the invention. U.S. Patent No. 2,594,097 (filed Nov. 15, 1949) (issued Apr. 22, 1952). In that case
the applicant for a body harness, titled a "device for promoting marital accord," deleted language that
the examiner suggested was "surplusage," and changed a submitted drawing following a meeting
between the applicant and the examiner by removing the lines in the diagram that depicted a woman's
breast. Letterfrom John A. Marzall, Comm'r of Pats., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., to Lewis Twyman,
Pat. Applicant (Apr. 5, 1951) (on file with authors). While the breast was ostensibly omitted as "sur-
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third approach is literary-and presents a methodological opportunity. As
demonstrated by the patents highlighted in this Article, the patent document
itself can be a culturally rich text that exists in conversation with both the patent system and the background culture. Professors Dan Burk and Jessica
Reyman have suggested approaching patents as a genre: a style of writing that
has its own internal conventions designed to appeal to a variety of different
audiences-administrative, scientific, judicial, and commercial.223 Patents can
accordingly be understood as discursive objects, situated within social contexts, that are subject to the full panoply of critical literary and linguistic theories.2 2 4 Professor Burk has deployed both structuralist and postmodem feminist
literary theories to deconstruct and "queer" the patent system, exposing gendered implications that too often fly beneath the radar of long-dominant economic analyses of patent law.225 The texts of pleasure patents reveal a diverse
and shifting relationship between the disclosed technologies and extant social
plusage," a subsequent letter from the examiner stated that the omission was "in the interest of propriety and decorum." Letter from John A. Marzall, Comm'r of Pats., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., to
Lewis Twyman, Pat. Applicant (Apr. 30, 1951) (on file with authors). The examiner apparently objected to some of the descriptive language in the application as surplusage as well, resulting in the
deletion of language describing the device as useful "where the husband has lost one or more hands or
arms, or where the husband is small of stature, or where there is other disparity, such as inthe strength
of the two," and stating that the invention could then "make normal sexual intercourse between husband and wife more easy of accomplishment and more pleasurable and healthful for the participants."
See Letter from John A. Marzall to Lewis Twyman (Apr. 5, 1951), supra (referring to language included in Lewis Twyman's original application for the body harness, see U.S. Patent Application
Serial No. 127,316 (filed Nov. 15, 1949)). While this patent file shows some pressure from the examiner to explain the benefits of the invention less explicitly (by excising the description of how the
device could aid a disabled husband), one file is insufficient to draw a conclusion of general pressure
from examiners to "clean up" the descriptions of pleasure patents, leaving open the question of how
the examination process affects descriptions of pleasure patents. The file histories of five other, early
patents, show no such correspondence. See U.S. Patent No. 1,863,533 (filed Aug. 8, 1929) (issued
Dec. 2, 1931) (fora Thermal Treatment Applicator); U.S. Patent No. 2,024,983 (filed Sept. 10, 1934)
(issued Dec. 17, 1935) (for a Device for Promoting Marital Accord); U.S. Patent No. 2,112,646 (filed
Aug. 10, 1936) (issued Mar. 29, 1938) (for a Device for the Treatment of Diseases of the Genital
Organs); U.S. Patent No. 2,559,059 (filed Oct. 24, 1949) (issued July 3, 1951) (for a Helper Device);
U.S. Patent No. 3,375,381 (filed June 30, 1966) (issued Mar. 26, 1968) (for a Cordless Electric Vibrator for Use on the Human Body).
223 Burk & Reyman, supra note 16, at 175 (listing the various communities interacting with the
patent system, including "federal bureaucrats," "technology transfer officers," "visual artists," "judges," "lawyers," "patent trolls," and "scholar") (internal quotations omitted).
2 4
Id. at 164 ("[W]e want to consider how the language of patent documents shapes meaning, not
simply in the process of technological innovation, but as an artifact of a society that values technological innovation.").
225 See Dan L. Burk, Feminism andDualism in IntellectualProperty, 15 AM. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & LAW 183, 185 (2007) (delving into the cross-disciplinary nature of "mind and body" and
"nature and culture" concepts previously analyzed under a feminist theory lens, from the perspective
of intellectual property law); see also DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE
REINVENTION OF NATURE 183 (1991) (shedding light on the second-class treatment women and feminists received during the 1980s because leaders of academia did not consider them to be credible contributors to scientific and technological innovation).
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norms and set forth a variety of different ways in which patented technologies
can facilitate happier and healthier sexual cultures. The markers of happiness
and healthiness shift across the patent texts just as they shift in the society that
the patented technologies are meant to improve. In order to establish patentability, the patent text must tell a story that successfully mediates the details of
the disclosed invention, the legal requirements of the Patent Act, and the social
norms surrounding the technology in question. 22 6
This analysis of pleasure patents also suggests the need for more sustained conversations between scholars of technology law and scholars of law
and sexuality. Compared with a broader legal system that has harshly penalized
nearly all forms ofnonprocreative, nonmarital sex, including sodomy, adultery,
fornication, masturbation, and sex work, 227 patent law-and to some extent
intellectual property more broadly 228-stands apart for its seemingly open embrace of sexual inventions. Although pleasure patents often do embody traditional sexual, gender, and marital norms, they nonetheless are an area of law in
which the federal government, after individualized review, has been giving
valuable property rights to entities that emphasize the importance ofmasturbation, same-sex sexuality, gender experimentation, and women's sexual autonomy. Patentees disclose explicitly sexual technologies, the Patent Office issues
patents to the inventors of such technologies, and courts enforce such patents
in litigation. 229 Accordingly, patent law complicates any straightforward "repressive hypothesis" 230 in which the legal system exhibits a single-minded antipathy towards nonprocreative, nonmarital sex.

226 See Burk & Reyman, supra note 16, at 181 ("Patents are commonly understood to be imbued
with information about technologies, but we argue that they collectively and simultaneously carry
information about the community in which they arise.").
227 See, e.g., UMMNI KHAN, VICARIOUS KINKS: S/M IN THE SOCIO-LEGAL IMAGINARY 10 (2014)
(unveiling the moral and legal policing of "s/m" ("sadism and masochism")); JOEY L. MOGUL, AN-

DREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE

IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2011) (tethering violence against the LGBT community to centuries of
racial oppression); Andrew Gilden, PunishingSexual Fantasy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 419, 419
(2016) (honing in on the complexities of Internet-posted content and virtual fantasies as grounds for
retribution); Kaplan, supra note 27, at 92 (focusing on obscenity statutes, criminalization of BDSM,
and constitutional frameworks for sex-related rights).
22
1 See Tushnet, supra note 26, at 275 (arguing that copyright's fair use doctrine favors works that
involve sexualization of earlier works). But see Rothman, supra note 23, at 119-20 (arguing that copyright and trademark laws often disfavor sexual materials).
229 See, e.g., Lambert Snyder Vibrator Co. v. Marvel Vibrator Co., 138 F. 82, 82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1905) (holding that "[t]he fact that a patent has not been adjudicated is not sufficient ground for refusing a preliminary injunction against its infringement"); TZU Techs., LLC v. Vibease, Inc., No. LA
CV15-04907, 2016 WL 6836951, at * 10 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2016) (considering "disputed terms" in a
patent infringement claim).
230 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 15 (Robert Hurley

trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976) (originating the term); see also Andrew Gilden, IntellectualProperty 's Queer Turn, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND HUMANITIES 549, 555 (Simon Stern,
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Several scholars have sought to move law and legal scholarship in a more
"sex positive" direction. Professor Margo Kaplan has set forth several guiding
principles for sex-positive law:
A sex-positive framework values sexual autonomy and all forms of
consensual sexual activities as sources of pleasure and fulfillment. It
rejects a view that sex and sexual pleasure are shameful. It respects
diverse ways of expressing and experiencing sexuality and sexual
pleasure, and rejects a culture that privileges male or heterosexual desire and pleasure above female or queer desire and pleasure.231
Measured against these principles, Professor Kaplan has critiqued First Amendment law and criminal law for focusing solely on the harms that might arise
from sexual pleasure, sidelining the positive side of pleasure. 232 Professor Katherine Franke similarly has critiqued feminist legal theory for focusing almost entirely on the potential harms associated with sex: rape, sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and exploitative pornography. 233 Rather than solely empowering
women to say "no" to various forms of bad sex, Professor Franke seeks a law
reform project that would better highlight women's experiences of sexual pleasure, asking, "Can law protect pleasure? Should it?" 234 Professor Susan Frelich
Appleton similarly focuses on the legal marginalization of women's pleasure,
envisioning a "culturally cliterate" body of law in which women learn to appreciate the potential for pleasure residing in their bodies. 235
Although several ofthese scholars do indeed discuss the role of sex toys in
a more sexually empowered society-and directly critique the sex toy cases discussed in Part II-none have looked at the patent system. 2 3 6 Given the overlap
between many of the themes examined in the pleasure patent database and the
visions of sex-positive law set forth in previous scholarship, the patent system's
treatment of sex toys merits broader attention. From the 1980s through the preMaksymilian Del Mar & Bernadette Meyler eds., 2020) (illustrating how IP law reflects Foucauldian
insights about the production of social norms).
231 Kaplan, supra note 27, at 95 (footnotes omitted) (focusing on the inherentvalue of pleasure in
sex, separate from romantic love, relationships, or child-bearing).
232 Id
at 91 (challenging the constitutional "calculus" that results from our society's negative
view of sex and sexual pleasure).
.33 Franke, supra note 27, at 181 ("Without a doubt, when it comes to sex, we have done a more
than adequate job of theorizing the right to say no, but we have left to others the task of understanding
what it might mean to say yes.").
4
11 Id. at 183.
235 Appleton, supra note 27, at 269-70 (seeking to "bring[] together sex-positive feminist theory
and mainstream family law" to "establish[] and place[] in a larger context the law's silence about
women's sexual pleasure").
236 See id at 327 (acknowledging the range of responses from the judiciary regarding access to
sex toys and the crucial role access to sexually-stimulating devices plays in building "cultural cliteracy"); Kaplan, supra note 27, at 115 (touching on the criminalization of certain sex practices, including
BDSM); Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 154, at 832.
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sent, patentees celebrate sexual pleasure both for its instrumental valueimproving marriage, countering loneliness, preventing disease-and for its own
intrinsic value. Moreover, women s pleasure is often front and center in pleasure
patent accounts. Many patentees detail the ways in which women-alone or with
partners-can use the disclosed technology to improve their sexual experiences.
Furthermore, these patents do not just allude to sexual pleasure in the abstract or
skirt around it through creative euphemisms; instead, they often describe, in detail, how the invention interacts with a woman's anatomy, centering the clitoris
in a way that seems to reflect the "cultural cliteracy" envisioned by Professor
Appleton. Particularly compared with federally supported abstinence-only education programs, 237 or the Department of Education's heavily critiqued guidelines on student sexual conduct, 238 the federal patent registry provides a pretty
thorough education on the anatomies and psychologies of sexual pleasure.
This is not to say, however, that the patent system is a bastion of sexually
liberated, ethical feminism. Patent law has welcomed sex toy entrepreneurs
into its fold almost certainly in part due to its free market commitments-by
providing property rights in novel and nonobvious inventions, patent law can
counter the public goods problem associated with intellectual investments and
facilitate a competitive marketplace. 239 Several scholars have warned against
adopting a libertarian, free market approach to law and sexuality, insulating
sexual domains from forms of regulation necessary to keep patriarchal dynamics in check. Professors Marc Spindelman, 2 4 0 Catherine MacKinnon, 24 1 and
Martha McCluskey 242 all have critiqued queer theorists for celebrating sexual
237 See Appleton, supra note 27, at 283-85 (highlighting the "Healthy Marriage Initiative" -a
program funded by the administration of President George W. Bush which promoted abstinence
before marriage, as one example of government intervention into American sex education).
238 Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 899 (2016).
239 See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of IntellectualProperty:
In Search ofFirstPrinciples,
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., Aug. 2012, at 397, 400-01 ("Public goods are typically described as being
nonrivalrous and nonexclusive.... There [is] a tendency for rational consumers to free ride on public
goods, taking the benefits without incurring the costs."). To address the free-rider problem, Professor
Burk explains, "[I]ntellectual property policy . . assign[s] property rights" to essentially "place[] a
legal fence around goods that cannot be physically fenced off," allowing the creator to obtain market
control (i.e., price-setting, production, and distribution) over their invention. Id
20 Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2004) (accusing the
court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., of "render[ing] [same-sex sexual violence]
legally invisible" (citing 523 U.S. 75 (1998))).
241 Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1081, 1091 (2004) (critiquing the Lawrence Court for presuming that a sexual encounterbetween a same-sex couple could not include or incite violence).
242 Martha T. McCluskey, How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, in FEMINIST AND
QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 115, 125

(Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds., 2009) (asserting that because
queer theory fluidly considers the "harmful and the beneficial in sex," it injects unwanted and unnecessary ambiguity into feminist-driven agendas, like eliminating unwanted sexual advances in the
workplace).
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freedoms, dark side and all, and in so doing, sidelining feminist concerns with
workplace inequality, sexual assault, and domestic violence.
These concerns do have some resonance in the patent context. First, the inventors in most of the pleasure patents are men, suggesting that the effect of
these patent grants is to give men control over technologies designed to be used
by women. Second, although many ofthese patented technologies do legitimately seem aimed at women's pleasure, others are quite arguably demeaning. One
example, U.S. Patent No. 7,122,000 B1 discloses "a water pipe shaped to be inserted into, and thereby utilize, the vagina as a water reservoir to provide sexual
stimulation during use of the water pipe, which may optionally be used to
smoke"; 243 in other words, a patent issued for a vagina bong. Another example,
U.S. Patent No. 5,620,429, discloses a sanitary napkin with a "circular bag" affixed to the outside, so that "[t]he husband can insert his penis" while his wife is
menstruating and "having continuous bleeding from her womb." 244 The patentee
disclosed the following useful purpose for this invention: it "makes it possible to
maintain the continuity of the love relationship between the husband and his
wife . . so that the wife can give her husband full sexual enjoyment at any time
he wishes." 245 So as much as patent law may be "sex positive," its libertarian
ethos opens up the system to a whole lot of patriarchy as well.
This Article certainly cannot resolve disputes about the proper quantum of
sexual morality that should be infused into the patent system, or how patent law
might best further the causes of sex equality or sexual freedom. Its aim is to
bring questions of intellectual property and the regulation of technology more
squarely into scholarly conversations about law and sexuality.
CONCLUSION

Technology and sexuality both have been subject to histories of regulation
that are deeply infused with moral judgment. And, as the laws oftechnology and
sexuality have evolved, moral questions have gradually loosened their grip over
legal doctrines in each area, opening both up to a diverse range of perspectives
about how to balance morals, markets, equality, and individual freedoms. Nevertheless, these domains have remained largely siloed from each other in legal
scholarship. This Article brings scholars in each domain together by demonstrating
that the patent system provides a rich intersection for the study of law, technology,
and sexuality. It shows that patents can be sexy, and sex can be patentable.

U.S. Patent No. 7,122,000 B1 col. 111. 7-10 (filed July 30, 2003) (issued Oct. 17, 2006).
U.S. Patent No. 5,620,429 col. 111. 16-17, 59-60 (filed June 22, 1995) (issued Apr. 15, 1997).
245 Id. at col. 111. 42-46.
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